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31 January 2008 The so called nuclear deal between India and USA took the back seat as the events of the last few months have shown. The Left parties successfully stalled the deal for their own reasons, perhaps as a means to show their clout in the coalition politics of India. It may also have been a means to do the Congress partners down just before the Gujarat elections and again show their strength. They may even be harbouring thoughts of tying up with the NDA in the future! In any case they reminded one of the typical Financial Advisers of the MoD, who have the power to say no to proposals put up by the Services HQ, without any responsibility for the consequences. They gloat over their authority while making the Services squirm, as no doubt Karat & Co made Manmohan Singh and the Congress squirm. The consequences made the PM back off and have delayed the whole process of acquiring civil nuclear technology and supplies. The process of negotiations with IAEA for safeguards and with NSG for supplies has been needlessly delayed and may even be permanently derailed. It has allowed time to several potential suppliers to have a rethink and Australia for one, with a change of administration, has categorically ruled out Uranium sales to India whereas the earlier PM was all for it. Similarly the additional thinking time has made 'some 130 nuclear experts and non-governmental groups in he US to send letters to governments to lobby for curbs on the controversial US nuclear deal with India'. "What we are doing here is calling upon the NSG states and the IAEA board of governors to take an extremely careful look at the proposal to exempt India from key safeguards, conditions for nuclear trade," Daryl Kimball, executive director of the US Arms Control Association, told AFP. The association was among lead groups of the signature campaign. Under the deal, the United States would provide India with nuclear fuel and technology even though the Asian nation has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." The other consequences which may jeopardize the deal are the fact that the chief US negotiator Nicholas Burns resigned and the US election process is in full swing leaving little time for Bush or others in the Administration to think of the nuclear deal. It even prompted the US Ambassador Mulford to hint that India would do well to finalise the deal before Bush retires or it may get delayed to 2010 or later, when the new administration may find the time for it. These developments must be viewed in the light of the increasing number of countries who are opting to go in for nuclear power to meet their energy needs. The increasing cost of fossil fuel has revived the interest in nuclear power as a viable tried and tested and safe alternative. In the recent past the UK have revived their strategy to go in for nuclear energy along with other forms. The British government has approved plans to build new nuclear reactors, a significant signal to the industry and a further push for nuclear's worldwide renaissance. Similarly Germany and Finland have new nuclear plants under construction. In the middle east Egypt, Iran, Abu Dhabi etc are all vying for nuclear power plants increasingly aided by France and Russia. It should be understood that India with its huge coal reserves has the option to go for cheaper coal based power plants, which would increase the global warming fears of the rest of the developed world. So in opting for nuclear power India has shown concern for the environment. At the same time the world and especially coalition partner the Left must realise that we cannot wait forever for the power needed for development. Recently PM Manmohan Singh indicated that the talks with the IAEA were progressing satisfactorily and the visiting Sarkozy made a strong case for nuclear cooperation with India. However, India must not be made to wait indefinitely for nuclear power. The PM had after his visit to China had proposed that India and China must cooperate in the nuclear field. Recent media reports are appended below: Indian PM proposes nuclear energy cooperation with China
Beijing (AFP)
Jan 15, 2008 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on the last day of a visit to China, said the world's two most populous nations -- who have a decades-long history of mistrust -- should work together to develop their nuclear energy programmes. "India seeks international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, including with China," Singh said, noting such cooperation could help the two countries meet their skyrocketing energy needs. "The rapid growth of India and China will lead to expanding demand for energy. We have no choice but to widen our options for energy availability and develop viable strategies for energy security," he said in a speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He did not go into further details. Singh's visit, the first here by an Indian premier in five years, comes as the two rising Asian giants try to strengthen ties and put their history of animosity behind them. Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on Monday signed a broad agreement pledging tighter economy and other links, which they said would push an often testy relationship to a new level of cooperation. It included a pledge to make a renewed effort to solve a Himalayan border dispute over which they fought a brief war in 1962. Later on Tuesday he met President Hu Jintao, who congratulated the Indian premier on a successful visit. "Your visit was short but highly productive. Let me congratulate you on the success of your visit," Hu said. Singh replied that the "two countries must do everything in their power to strengthen our multifaceted cooperation with new ties of friendship and partnership." India has already agreed a deal for the United States to provide nuclear fuel and technology, but that has been on hold -- in part because of opposition within Singh's own administration. China has expressed reservations over the deal, citing concerns about the proliferation of nuclear materials. In his earlier speech, Singh noted that the two nations had agreed to set a target of 60 billion dollars in bilateral trade in 2010, up from nearly 40 billion dollars last year. "We should harness our complementarities and synergies in the areas of trade and business," he said. "India's growing consumer market, skilled human resources, and software excellence together with China's own large market, its manufacturing prowess and cost competitiveness provide the platform for exponential growth in our economic ties." Both sides have issued strong statements on their willingness to eventually solve the border row. India says China occupies 38,000 square kilometres (14,670 square miles) of its Himalayan territory, while Beijing claims the whole of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is 90,000 square kilometres. Nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries could help slow the depletion of world energy resources, said Xu Liping, an international relations expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "The populations of India and China constitute one-third of humanity. The energy consumption of these two engines is very great, so joint development of nuclear power can help reduce resource consumption," he said. "This could have a positive significance." Britain revives nuclear power
Jan 11,
2007 British Energy Secretary John Hutton told lawmakers in London Thursday that nuclear energy "should have a role to play in this country's future energy mix alongside other low-carbon sources." Nuclear power, the secretary added, was "tried and tested, safe and secure," arguing that it was also a relatively cheap way to meet Britain's climate protection targets. The decision comes as somewhat of a surprise, given Labor's previous statements. The British government as recently as 2003 said it was opposed to the expansion of nuclear energy, yet now seems to pay tribute to the worldwide renaissance nuclear energy has experienced in connection with the struggle to stop global warming -- London until 2050 wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent. The plan to revive nuclear may also be a domestic necessity, as Britain's North Sea fossil fuels are depleting. Hutton said there was no limit on the construction of new plants, adding that the industry should pay for them. "I invite energy companies to bring forward plans to build and operate new nuclear power stations," he said. The industry is thrilled by the prospect of blooming in Britain, with French giant Areva already underlining that it would focus on the British market for the future, and domestic British Energy, which already runs eight reactors in the country, said it is able to bring new plants online by 2017. Currently, nuclear energy provides nearly 20 percent of Britain's electricity needs, but most of the 19 reactors are so old that they will have to be shut down by 2035. The Chernobyl disaster had initially stopped the expansion of nuclear energy, but the prospects of relatively cheap and CO2-free domestic power generation seem to outplay the warnings of environment organizations such as Greenpeace, who point to the problem of nuclear waste storage and security in case of terrorist attacks. The renaissance of nuclear is of course also one dominated by the books, as the recent price hike of crude oil to $100 a barrel makes atomic power more competitive. Already, Finland and nuclear energy powerhouse France have new nuclear plants in the pipeline, and in the United States, companies are also gearing up to build new plants. Countries that have previously agreed to phase out nuclear energy -- like Sweden and Belgium -- have prolonged the running times of their plants or are even rethinking the phase-out. The international industry is set to woo the British market; the likely candidates are domestic Centrica and British Energy, Areva and EDF from France, and RWE and Eon from Germany. The two German companies might be interested because nuclear is spurned at home. Eon and RWE will likely hope that the support nuclear gets in Britain will influence the debate in Germany, where a plan struck by the previous government to phase out nuclear energy by 2021 made it into the coalition agreement of Chancellor Angela Merkel. While Merkel and most of her Conservative Party colleagues would rather have nuclear stay in the mix, the other half of the government, the center-left Social Democratic Party, has staunchly opposed rethinking the phase-out. The German Atomic Forum, an association of companies, research facilities and institutions involved in the nuclear energy industry, has called for Germany to follow the British trend. "The fact is that, when it comes to nuclear energy, Germany is becoming ever more isolated," a spokesperson for the Atomic Forum told Friday's Berliner Zeitung newspaper. Indian PM hopes nuclear talks with IAEA will conclude soon
Jan
25, 2008 Indian negotiators have held several rounds of talks at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since last month. The IAEA negotiations follow India and the United States signing a pact in 2006 reversing India's status as a nuclear pariah after three decades of international sanctions. "One must recognise that international negotiations do take time," Singh told reporters in New Delhi at a joint press conference with visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy. "Our discussions in the International Atomic Energy Agency are moving forward. It is our sincere hope that they can be concluded successfully without further delay." India, which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, needs to clear hurdles with the IAEA and the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group as part of the landmark nuclear cooperation deal with the United States. The civilian nuclear energy deal -- regarded as Singh's main foreign policy achievement -- is however facing domestic pressure from the government's Communist allies who say the pact comprises India's strategic programme. Sarkozy said he understood India's need to for nuclear power, and pushed France's position as a potential technology supplier. "If we do not let India accede to civilian nuclear energy it will have to go to more polluting means," he said. French nuclear technology was the safest in the world, Sarkozy said, adding France would help India get the IAEA waiver. The French nuclear energy group Areva estimates that India, currently the fourth biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, will need 25 to 30 nuclear reactors. As well as the United States and France, Russia is also eyeing fuel-hungry India as a major atomic energy market. In an e-mail interview with the Hindustan Times newspaper published Friday, Sarkozy said India and France were "on the verge" of an agreement to engage in civil nuclear energy cooperation. "The is one of the stakes of my visit in India: to bring to fruition this evolution that I deem essential for India's development and the protection of the global environment," Sarkozy said. Community India, France sign nuclear accord framework
Jan 25,
2008 The agreement covers cooperation on research to the supply of reactors, said an official accompanying French President Nicolas Sarkozy on a state visit to India. India, which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, needs to clear hurdles with the UN's nuclear watchdog and the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group as part of a landmark nuclear deal it signed with the United States in 2006. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said Friday that talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were "moving forward," although he is facing domestic opposition. Singh's left-wing allies fear an accord with the IAEA, which would involve unprecedented inspections, would compromise the country's strategic programme. The French nuclear energy group Areva estimates that India, currently the fourth biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, will need 25 to 30 nuclear reactors. As well as the United States and France, Russia is also eyeing fuel-hungry India as a major atomic energy market. India also agreed Friday to take a stake in a scheme to build an advanced reactor in southern France that will carry out research into nuclear fuel and other materials, the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) said. New Delhi will take a three-percent stake in the project under a cooperation agreement signed by the CEA and India's Department of Atomic Energy (DEA). "In exchange for financial participation, India will have guaranteed access to the facility to carry out its own research into the behaviour of irradiated material," the CEA said in a statement. Work started in March last year on building the 500-million-euro (735-million-dollar) Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR) at Cadarache, near the French Mediterranean port city of Marseille. Due to start operation in 2014, the JHR is a light-water reactor, designed to test fuel for future nuclear reactors, see how materials respond to radiation stress and produce isotopes for medical use. India will become the ninth partner in the scheme. The others are the CEA, the French electricity generator EDF and nuclear plant maker Areva, as well as research institutes in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands and Japan. Under the current financing arrangements, the three French partners account for 80 percent France forms consortium to supply nuclear power to Abu Dhabi
Jan 11,
2008 "An exclusive partnership with a view to building and then operating two third-generation nuclear reactors in the emirate" was sealed by the three companies on Friday, the paper said on its website. French nuclear technology group Areva, oil company Total and utility group Suez are the three companies in the consortium. The report said the companies responded to interest from the water and electricity authority in the emirate, ADWEA, which has outlined plans to build the reactors. Les Echos said the companies were now ready to supply and operate the electricity-producing plants when a final decision is made by Abu Dhabi to proceed with the project -- something that could happen "in the next few months." The paper also said that French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who is to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates next week, is to sign a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with the UAE. "After Morocco, Algeria and Libya, the Emirates will be the fourth Arab country to sign this type of agreement," the paper said. Australia reverses plan to sell uranium to India
Jan
15, 2008 The deal was struck by former premier John Howard last August, shortly before his conservative government was ousted in elections by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's Labor Party. Smith said he had told a visiting Indian envoy that the new government would not sell the nuclear fuel to any country that had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "It's a long standing commitment of the Australian Labor Party that we don't authorise the export of uranium to countries who are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," he said. "India is a nation state that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I don't think there's any expectation in the international community that it will become a member." Smith made the remarks at a news conference after talks in Perth with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's special envoy Shyam Saran, which he described as a "good and friendly meeting". "The Australian government is very much looking forward to taking the relationship with India to an even better level," he said. Howard had defended his government's decision to sell uranium to India, which has nuclear weapons, saying the deal was subject to strict guarantees that the fuel would be used for electricity generation only. Howard, a strong supporter of US President George W. Bush, also noted that the sales would depend on the implementation of a landmark civilian nuclear deal between New Delhi and Washington. The deal would allow India to buy civilian nuclear technology while possessing nuclear weapons, making it an exception under the NPT. Australia has the world's largest known reserves of uranium and had been under pressure from the US to match a deal to sell uranium concentrate to China -- which has signed the NPT -- with an agreement to do the same for India. However, with India's controversial nuclear pact with the United States now in limbo, Singh held out the possibility Tuesday of civilian nuclear cooperation with China. On the last day of a visit to China, he said the world's two most populous nations -- who have a decades-long history of mistrust -- should work together to develop their nuclear energy programmes. "India seeks international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, including with China," Singh said, noting such cooperation could help the two countries meet their skyrocketing energy needs. "The rapid growth of India and China will lead to expanding demand for energy. We have no choice but to widen our options for energy availability and develop viable strategies for energy security," he said in a speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. India's deal for the US to provide nuclear fuel and technology has been on hold -- in part because of opposition within Singh's own administration. China has also expressed reservations over the deal, citing concerns about the proliferation of nuclear materials.
IAEA and NSG will be no
Cakewalk The negotiations on an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA Governing Board and talks with members of the NSG to seek an exception for India are likely to be long and hazardous. The United States has considerable influence in the IAEA Board and, as the founder of the NSG it has the necessary clout to determine the outcome of the informal group. But, over the years, positions of individual countries have crystallized in these bodies and they are likely to give us a hard time despite the US being our 'sherpa' on the climb. The commitment to non-proliferation is strong in both these bodies and it will be difficult for members to change their mindsets by a mere nod from the United States. Moreover, the United States stands to gain from an orchestrated debate in both these bodies, so that the right stage is set for the hard days ahead of implementation of the deal. There is much speculation about the stage of drafting of the two documents, which should emerge from the IAEA and the NSG before the US Congress proceeds to vote on the 123 Agreement. But this should be the least of the problems. Neither our mission in Vienna, nor the Department of Atomic Energy would have remained idle since July 2005. In fact, they had not remained idle even before: It was quite normal for them to prepare plans for the eventuality of an accommodation with the non-proliferation regime. As for India-specific safeguards as different from full-scope safeguards, these already exist for Tarapur, Rajasthan and Kudankulam. It is simply a matter of concluding such an agreement in the case of designated civilian facilities. The general contours of such arrangements have already been discussed between Dr R Chidambaram and Dr Mohamed ElBaradei on a couple of occasions and the members of the Board, who are directly interested in the issue must have given their inputs to the IAEA. It should also not be difficult for the IAEA Board and the General Conference to meet at short notice to approve such agreements at very short notice, if there is political will. Incidentally, Dr Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, leads our delegation to the General Conference, while our ambassador in Vienna is on the Board of Governors. An important point to note is that the Board has to recognise that there will be a qualitative difference in the status of India in the IAEA when the new arrangements are in place. We are presently in the company of Pakistan and Israel when it comes to safeguards issues. The three countries vote against an Egyptian-sponsored call for all member States to accept full-scope safeguards even though there is language in the resolution that this will be in accordance with their respective international obligations. The vote is often preceded by long and hard negotiations with Egypt and its supporters. Even after the adoption of India-specific safeguards, India cannot endorse full-scope safeguards, but we will have to work out a way in which we distance ourselves from Israel and Pakistan. But the negotiations in the Board will be coloured by past acrimony on this issue. Egypt and other countries, even while accepting the Indian arrangement, will maintain that India should eventually accept full-scope safeguards. They will also want to maintain their reservations on India's status till we become either a Nuclear Weapon State or a non-Nuclear Weapon State. On the Indian side too, a change is imperative. In our bid to keep our distance from the regulatory role of the IAEA, we have devised a number of measures for ourselves. Though we are keen advocates of the technical cooperation programme, we do not accept technical assistance from it. (Pakistan and China accept such assistance.) We do not accept even safety inspections from the IAEA in our installations. Our attitude to the department of safeguards of the IAEA should undergo a change. These changes will be slow in coming, considering our present regulations and attitudes. The additional protocol to the safeguards agreement was devised by the IAEA to strengthen the inspection regime and most countries have routinely accepted the model protocol the Board has approved. We had considered signing an additional protocol to our own safeguards, but we found that it would be difficult to frame a protocol for our special circumstances. By requiring India to sign 'an' additional protocol rather than 'the' additional protocol, the US negotiators are supposed to have shown flexibility in this regard. But it will take some time and effort to carry the Board with us on a text that recognises the new situation. Another additional complication with the IAEA is that we do not want the Board to vote upon these documents before we are sure that the NSG and the US Congress are ready to follow through. The NSG will be a particular challenge as negotiating for an exception for India from its guidelines will be like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire. The NSG was set up specifically to deny India nuclear fuel and technology after our explosion of 1974. France [Images], at that time a non-party to the NPT, had agreed to supply fuel to India and the formation of the group, originally of seven countries, including France, ended that deal. In 1992, the revelations about Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons programme spurred the NSG to adopt controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods that could make a contribution to explosive technology in the hands of non-Nuclear Weapon States. Between the original guidelines that required application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and physical protection against unauthorised use of transferred material and the additional requirements of a strict regime for use of dual-use technology, there is a veritable fortress of rules and lists to prevent proliferation. In 2004, the members even adopted a 'catch all' mechanism, which authorises members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons programme even if the export material does not appear on one of the control lists. The fact, of course, is that determined States and individuals like A Q Khan have been able to penetrate the fortress without any let or hindrance. The regime is voluntary and there is no requirement for prior clearance of exports with the group, but as in the instance of Russia [Images]n supplies to India in 2001, the other members can exert pressure on individual countries, which violate the guidelines. Russia was able to supply in 2006 only with the implicit understanding of the US. Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other so that potential proliferators cannot approach several suppliers with the same request and get different responses. They are also expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. The guidelines do not remain static, as members tend to add new items to the prohibited list, especially of dual-use items. An informal grouping, the Zangger Committee, with a similar mandate was already in existence ever since the NPT came into force. The Zangger Committee characterises itself as a 'faithful interpreter of Article III paragraph 2 of the NPT.' The Group's objective was to reach a common understanding on the definition of 'equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material' and the conditions and procedures for such exports. Though The NSG adopted the Zangger Committee's 'Trigger List' and depended on it to resolve some non-proliferation issues at a time when China had not yet joined the NSG, the Zangger Committee was not considered adequate to deal with the challenges of India and Iraq, first because the Zangger Committee dealt only with NPT signatories and its decisions were not legally binding on its members. Their common mission and their co-location in Vienna have made the Zangger Committee and the NSG non-proliferation twins born out of the NPT. India had kept a distance from the NSG in the past as we did not want to give any impression that we had anything to do with the NPT institutions, even though we were using the NSG guidelines to regulate our own export of nuclear technology and materials. When the NSG began an outreach programme with non-NSG members in 2001, we participated in it once, but when we found that it was not aimed at accommodating our needs, we declined further contacts in Vienna. We knew that we did not miss much as Israel and Pakistan, which went to such meetings, came back disappointed that the NSG had no intention to relax its guidelines. Under pressure from NSG members, who were otherwise friendly, we suggested that we would not be averse to talks in New Delhi. Accordingly, a team of ambassadors from Vienna and some officials from NSG capitals came to New Delhi for an interaction. It was evident from these meetings that, unless there was a change in the US position, such meetings would be futile. The NSG members at that time were aware of an Indian proposal to open up additional nuclear establishments for IAEA inspection in return for relaxation of the NSG guidelines, but the members, like the Americans, were not enthusiastic. The atmosphere in the NSG improved after the India-US Joint Statement of 2005, though an American proposal to put the nuclear deal on the agenda of the NSG Plenary Meeting in May 2006 was not accepted as the deal had not become operational. On the Russian supply of fuel to India in 2006, the US State Department stated: 'Deals to supply that fuel should move forward on the basis of a joint initiative, on the basis of steps that India will take, but it has not yet taken.' Japan and Australia were particularly firm on examining matters only after the India-US deal became operational. In the NSG, the general trend was for countries, which have nuclear power plants and other equipment to sell to be more positive than those, which had no business to transact under any new arrangement. A fundamental premise of the NSG is that any country that receives supplies should accept full-scope safeguards. China initially joined the Zangger Committee and not the NSG because China was at that time in the process of supplying a reactor to Pakistan. Since the NPT does not require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, China's membership of the Zangger Committee did not prevent them from supplying the reactor to Pakistan. By joining the NSG at that time, China would have forsaken its right to supply nuclear equipment to Pakistan. A US representative to the NSG revealed this when China applied for NSG membership subsequently. Since India will not accept full-scope safeguards under the deal, the NSG will need to make a change in its fundamental position. The India-specific safeguards, which the IAEA approves, will be subjected to an analysis to see whether it will have sufficient safeguards against diversion of nuclear material or dual use equipment. For this reason, Russia is supposed to have advised India to circulate its draft of the safeguards to the members of the NSG in advance. The strategy of the United States in the context of the NSG will be to ask the NSG members to take note of the steps that India has taken as a 'contributing partner' in the non-proliferation regime. It will also ask NSG members to transfer the trigger list items and related technologies only to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India as long as India continues to meet the other requirements of the NSG. The relaxation will be sought on the ground that India has accepted IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for its civilian nuclear facilities, it has a moratorium on testing in place, it will sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, it has stringent export controls and it will adhere strictly to the NSG guidelines on exports. Here, interested governments will argue that India had no intention to be a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime as the Indian position is that the nuclear deal is merely an energy agreement. Another requirement of the NSG is that adequate verification measures should be in place to ensure that the supplies of the participating states are not diverted to weapons purposes. The bilateral agreement between India and the US envisages IAEA inspections of civilian establishments in India and a certain amount of trust is an element in the agreement. A multilateral group like the NSG might want other verification measures, which may prove anathema to India. China's position will be the most crucial in the entire NSG exercise. At the first NSG meeting after the India-US Joint Statement, China had pressed the US for a similar deal for Pakistan. China has been lying low, but it has not made secret of its opposition to the deal. But China tends to be eminently reasonable in the international arena and, therefore, may point out that the exception should be criteria based rather than country based. If other countries adopt similar measures as India has done, they should be treated in a similar manner. Though the US position is that no other exception will be made, it may close its eyes to the advantage it may give to Pakistan and China to enhance their nuclear cooperation. The Chinese position may enjoy some support among the other NSG members. China will also look for some gains for itself in the light of the impression that the 123 Agreement with China is not as favourable to China as in the Indian case. Although nuclear tests are not mentioned in the 123 Agreement, it is premised on an Indian moratorium on testing, which finds mention in the India-US Joint Statement of 2005. The debate in Parliament and elsewhere about the need for India to protect its sovereign right to test may well have created suspicion in the minds of the NSG members and they may well make a reference in the revised guidelines to the termination of the arrangements in the event of a nuclear test by India. The US will naturally welcome such a provision, which, according to it, is already included in the 123 Agreement. The extent of challenges within the NSG will depend on the degree of firmness with which the United States will defend the agreement and ensure that it is not changed to India's disadvantage. But at the same time, the US will not favour a situation, which will dismantle the NSG and leave it to the member States to deal with India and others in accordance with their own interests. Although an exception for India will end the rationale for the existence of the group, the US will favour continuation of the Group and will do everything possible to maintain the integrity of the NSG. The US has promised all help to persuade their friends and allies to accommodate India, but India will have to work bilaterally with each of the 45 members, as implementation of the guidelines is an individual rather than a collective responsibility. The success we have accomplished in befriending Brazil [Images] and South Africa should help us in the NSG. In the past, they have been rather adamant about full-scope safeguards. The ultimate compromise that the NSG should make is to accept India as a member of the group. It will be logical as no other country has better credentials than India in terms of the objective of the NSG to prevent exports that will lead to proliferation. Even in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, authorities on export controls had certified that India had an impeccable record in export control. If the criteria for membership of the NSG alone were to be considered, without considering our NPT status, there was no reason to exclude India from the NSG. Since India will soon have the capacity to export not only components, but also reactors, the NSG should welcome India to its fold. It may be seen today as a revolutionary move like admitting Russia into NATO, but today's miracles may be tomorrow's reality. |
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