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WHAT'S HOT?
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ANALYSIS OF
RECENT HAPPENINGS |
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Command
and Control of Nuclear Forces in South Asia -- by LT GENERAL PRAN PAHWA (Reproduced with permission from SPs Military Yearbook 2001) |
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New
Delhi, 04 May 2001 Alexei Arbatov has expressed the view in Jonathan Schell's
book The Gift of Time' that the only possible or desirable relationship
between two nuclear powers is mutual nuclear deterrence unless they are
allies or out of range. India and Pakistan are both deemed nuclear powers
having acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. They are neither allies nor out
of range but they have so far not managed to establish a stable nuclear
deterrence between them. The main reason for this is that they have yet to
create robust and responsive command and control systems for their nuclear
weapons. Command
and Control System This is not unusual for countries in the initial stages after
becoming nuclear. Their tendency is to build up the visible symbols of
their nuclear strength like warheads and missiles rather than expend funds
on the 'soft kill' areas like command and control and electronic warfare,
whose benefits are intangible. A large inventory of nuclear weapons by
itself however, cannot ensure deterrence during peace or their effective
use in war. The weapons must be complemented by a suitable command and
control system (also called C"l for Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence). A command and control system is an
arrangement of sensors, communications and command centres. Its major
areas are warning and damage assessment, command and decision making, and
supporting communications. Like the nervous system of the human body, it
is used to carry out the will of the command authority. An enduring
command and control system means having absolute control over nuclear
weapons under all conditions and at all levels. If command and control
fails, nothing else matters. Deterrence Deterrence on the other hand is the nuclear stalemate between
two nuclear powers whereby either side refrains from using nuclear weapons
first out of fear of retaliation. It is a state of mind and is brought
about by a command and control structure that is capable of absorbing a
first strike and thereafter reconstituting itself to carry out a
retaliatory strike. The danger lies not so much in an annihilating first
strike as in the perceived inadequacy of the command and control system.
Deterrence could fail if an impression is conveyed that either side is not
fully organised to retaliate, or that its capability to retaliate could be
seriously undermined by a nuclear first strike. If however, the deterree
is convinced in his mind that the deterror's command system will function
smoothly in all respects and under all conditions, he will not be tempted
to undertake a first strike. Political leaders, particularly in
India, seem to recognise
the controlled release of nuclear weapons during war as the only
function of a command and control system, but this role only comes into
play after deterrence has failed. The primary function of a command and
control system is to create deterrence for which its deployment in peace
is imperative. In this period it must throughout the year convey the
country's will to deter by planning, controlling, signaling, ensuring
safety, and preventing accidental release of weapons. In fact, raising the
nuclear alert state through the command and control system can be the most
significant deterrence message that a country can send. An incident that took place in the
Indian subcontinent illustrates the role a command and control system can
play during peace in deterring a nuclear war. A few years ago the western
media printed the news that due to India's worsening relations with
Pakistan over Kashmir, it had moved its nuclear missiles from their peace
time location in the south of the country to a location close to the
Pakistan border. The news item created a sensation. The Indian government
was quick to deny it but the whole affair could have easily snowballed
into a nuclear confrontation. With no nuclear command and control system
deployed, the most reliable indicator of the country's state of nuclear
readiness and intentions was missing and the situation was ideal for
rumours to flourish. Considering the tense relations between the two
countries and the large scope for misunderstandings, Pakistan could have
been tempted into pre-empting India by undertaking a first strike. Imperatives
in South Asia It is to obviate the possibility of such incidents that it is essential for the two South Asian countries to deploy a nuclear command and control system. There are other imperatives too. While the consequences of a nuclear war are horrendous anywhere, they will be utterly devastating in the Indian subcontinent. In no other area are two nuclear adversaries, geographically as well as in other ways, so closely intertwined. For eight months in a year the winds blow from Pakistan side towards India. The fallout of a nuclear attack on Pakistan will therefore drift towards northern and western India. Similarly, there are a number of rivers that flow through India and then enter Pakistan. A nuclear attack on India would pollute their water. The time of flight of a missile from launch to impact between the two countries is less than two minutes in most cases leaving no time for any precautionary act even if a warning is received. There is also another important reason. Most people who migrated to Pakistan after partition left behind some members of their families in India. There are thus people in both countries that have relatives on the other side of the border and whose Iives would be threatened in case of a nuclear attack. India and Pakistan therefore cannot afford to have a nuclear exchange even by accident and an essential requirement for this is for both sides to have a reliable command and control system. One of the reasons why the two
countries may be hesitating at structuring a nuclear command and control
system could be the expense involved preferring, as already mentioned, to
rather spend their relatively modest budgets on acquiring warheads and
delivery systems. The perception that a command and control system is
astronomically expensive is based on the systems established by the two
nuclear super powers, USA and Russia. There is in fact no standard model
for a nuclear command and control system. Each country must design its
system according to its own technological capabilities, security
commitments and nuclear policy The requirements of India and Pakistan are
quite different from those of USA and Russia and their command and control
system need not be anywhere near as expensive as theirs. The USA, for example, has a nuclear
arsenal running into thousands of warheads that are deployed around the
world on Iand, air, and sea based delivery systems. Its technological
capabilities in the field of nuclear weaponry, delivery systems,
communications and space are highly advanced. In Russia it faces an
adversary that has an equally large arsenal and advanced technological
capabilities and is capable of accurately targeting its nuclear weapons.
It therefore has to have a very complex and sophisticated command and
control system with ground, air, and space based sensors backed by a
multi-level communication set up. The requirements of India and
Pakistan are very modest in comparison. Both have only a small number of
nuclear weapons to control and their deployment will be within the borders
of their respective countries only. India has a limited capability for
launching reconnaissance and communication satellites while Pakistan has
none. Both sides lack the capability to target the other's nuclear weapons
accurately and can only engage his value targets with any degree of
confidence. Neither has any sea based nuclear weapons platforms to
control. India however has another adversary in China whose technological
capabilities are superior to Pakistan and is capable of engaging weapons
accurately. It will need to cater for the China factor also in designing
its command and control system. 'Decapitation' or the separation of
the weapon systems from the command authority is however within the
capability of both sides. One way of achieving this would be to target and
destroy the national command authority. This could be dangerously
destabilising. The national command post must therefore be hardened to
withstand a nuclear attack. In addition, there is a need for a clear line
of succession so that even if the attack is successful the nominated
successor can take over immediately. The other possible method of decapitation is to target the communication system which is far more vulnerable. Survivability of communications is essential because, apart from controlling the weapon systems, they are also required to run the government, organise civil defence measures, and ultimately terminate hostilities. Communications must therefore not only be hardened against the effects of a nuclear attack but must also be reliable and survivable. Pakistan's Command and Control
System There is little indication
that all these requirements have been taken very seriously in the
subcontinent. Of the two, Pakistan appears to be more in tune with the
rest of the world in appreciating the necessity of nuclear command and
control. It has a focused nuclear strategy primarily aimed at deterring
India from exploiting its conventional military superiority against it. It has already established a
National Command Post at Faislabad with an alternate site at the Air Force
base at Chaklala. In addition it has also given out the broad outline of
its proposed command and control system. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)
will be the central authority under which there will be a Strategic Plans
Division, a Development Control Committee, and an Employment Control
Committee. All the country's strategic organisations involved in research
and development of nuclear weapons will be placed under the NCA. The
mechanism for policy formulation, employment and development control over
all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organisations has thus been
created. Indian
Perceptions India, on the other hand, has
taken no overt steps towards establishing a credible command and control
system. Little is officially known about its thinking on the issue apart
from the draft Nuclear Doctrine which is vague on specifics. This document
lays down that the nuclear weapons will be tightly controlled and the
authority to release them for use will be the Prime Minister or his
designated successor. Apart from that it only emphasises general
requirements like the need for survivability, flexibility, responsiveness,
unity of command and so on. This draft has not been officially approved so
far and nor have the Prime Minister's successors been designated. Some
initial steps towards establishing a skeleton command and control system
may have been taken but there is no information about it. In India there
is little transparency where nuclear issues are concerned. India's thinking on the question of
nuclear deterrence and the need for command and control system for nuclear
weapons appears to be at variance with those of the other nuclear powers
if one were to go by what George Perkovich has to say in his book India's
Nuclear Bomb'. Perkovich interviewed a few Indian politicians and nuclear
scientists and according to him their general feeling was that it was
possible to effect deterrence without prior deployment of nuclear weapons
mated to delivery systems. This is apparently the government's view as
well and may explain why no steps have been taken till now to deploy
nuclear weapons. Those interviewed also had some
apprehensions about establishing a command and control system. It was felt
that if a proper system with set rules and procedures was deployed there
was a danger that the control of the scientific establishment and
political leadership over nuclear weapons would be eroded. Moreover, if
nuclear weapons were deployed the military would assume a major policy
making role, which was against the past practice of excluding it from
anything dealing with nuclear issues. They felt that it would adequately
serve the purpose if the weapons were given to the armed forces at the
appropriate time. This is confused thinking with a
touch of naivete and is perhaps the reason why there is no visible
evidence of a command and control system for the Indian nuclear forces.
There could be two other possible reasons. One is that the detailed
structuring of the command and control system can only be carried out by
the armed forces and they are as a matter of policy excluded from nuclear
planning. The other is that India's acquisition of nuclear weapons was not
in response to any particular threat whereas a command and control system
has to be designed on the basis of a specific threat. China was cited as
the threat after the nuclear tests in 1998 but if that were really the
case India should have developed its nuclear capability in the 60s and 70s
when its relations with China were at their nadir. A weak or non-existent command and
control system that cannot survive an attack is an incentive to strike
first and is a destabilising factor because a wrong signal or an accident
could launch a nuclear war. An effective and survivable system on the
other hand allows the leadership to see the situation as it develops. It
collects information and presents it to the decision-makers
in the appropriate manner so that it can decide what action to take to
achieve deterrence. It is simplistic on the part of the Indian leadership to presume that there is no particular need for a nuclear command and control system in normal times and the weapons can be handed over to the armed forces at the last moment when required. Anyone who has functioned under time pressure and in the stressed environment of war knows that a certain amount of pre-planning, delegation of command, extensive exercises simulating various contingencies and rehearsals of drills and procedures are required to achieve the desired level of effectiveness. This can only be possible if the system is deployed in peace. India also needs to crystallise its threat perceptions so that the command and control system can be tailored to meet it. Make
a Beginning A command and control system evolves over a period of time and improves as it is progressively modified to overcome the shortcomings noticed during war gaming and other exercises. What India and Pakistan need to do is to make a beginning and put into place an elementary system to start with. This can be refined in course of time and made more survivable. A start needs to be made immediately. Both also need to be a little more transparent about the subject because lack of factual information could give rise to rumours and undermine deterrence |