INDIA
DEFENCE CONSULTANTS
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WHAT'S
HOT? –– ANALYSIS OF RECENT HAPPENINGS |
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NUCLEAR DEAL WITH USA –– CATCH 22? An IDC Analysis
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New
Delhi, 09 November 2005
The Institute of Defence Studies &
Analyses (IDSA)
staged a coup of sorts last month when Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran
agreed to speak to a select audience and made a "policy
statement on India's Nuclear Policy", reportedly at the
instance of Ms Arundhati Ghose, India's former ambassador in
the UN. Normally Foreign Secretaries shy away from discussing
nuclear policy and hence this was a treat and the hall was full with
India's top analysts, nuclear scientists and senior officers of the
Armed Forces, especially the Navy. The
seminal talk was held at the India Habitat Centre under the aegis
of the Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses. IDSA now finally
has a new Director N S Sisodia, an ex- Harvard trained bureaucrat who
had served in the MOD and NSC, when Mr Brajesh Misra was the
NSA. The new Director comes with good insides of the policies
of the Government, as he was the No 3 man in the NSA
secretariat when the Kargil report was produced so swiftly. As a
retired IAS Secretary he has good access to the ruling
bureaucrats, which in India can be a great asset, even in today's
days of liberalisation. The
Foreign Secretary's brilliant speech was variously reported in the
media. The gist of his speech gave a background of past nuclear
policies of the Government and how despite espousing nuclear
disarmament, India was forced to go nuclear for reasons he listed.
Then he went on to prove that India was a very responsible
nuclear power and needed to be recognised as such. The deal with
USA stipulated that India would look to the USA to provide nuclear
technology and convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to do
likewise. The onus was on USA and President Bush. Mr Saran made
the deal sound simple but the eagle-eyed Ms Arundhati in
the audience questioned him about India's plans to separate India's
military and civilian nuclear facilities, about which he had been
silent –– she had heard that there was no such road map. The Foreign
Secretary agreed that there was no road map about a very crucial aspect and surprisingly he hinted that the
ball was in USA's court –– which actually meant that it was in
the hands of the US Congress and Bush to act first on their side of
the deal. The
US–India nuclear deal faced some opposition in the US Congress and
Condelezza Rice and Bush were doing their utmost to woo them. The
debate in Congress was delayed. In any case media reported the deal
was hurriedly finalised and presented to Bush and Manmohan Singh
–– after some last minute overnight work by officials which
included India's NSA too. Hence several details had been left for
later and here emerges the Catch 22 situation. If India begins to
separate civilian and military facilities at considerable cost and
the US Congress does not pass the needed laws –– India would be
the loser. If USA passes all the needed laws and India drags its
feet on separation –– the US may have to go along and of course
other nations would want similar arrangements. Therefore
to learn that the official statement was to the effect that there
was no road map for separation of military and civilian nuclear
facilities, which are deeply intertwined in India, was surprising to
say the least. It is only after
separation that IAEA can have inspection rights on the civil nuclear
facilities. We link this with India's stand on Iran, which is
smarting at the special treatment being given to India. Unlike India,
Iran was a signatory to the NPT like North Korea. However, USA
treated
North Korea with kid gloves as it had the Bomb but Iran was
only nearing it –– and USA was hell bent to stop it. Japan was also
silently burning about the Indo–US deal and the new Japanese
Defence Minister was charged with the task to remodel Japan's Self
Defence policy, which was totally in the grip of USA and which
prohibited Japan to achieve attack capabilities or to export arms.
The situation was very interesting and even the beleaguered Natwar
Singh made some interesting premature comments on India's stand on
Iran's nuclear options. Speaking
to experts on how India could separate the facilities, the answers
were invariably that the Government had little choice except to make
either Tarapur, (plutonium reprocessing facility) or BARC (storage
of nuclear plutonium cores and thermo nuclear research) into a
military facility, and then duplicate the needed appropriate
facility at that site for civilian use. It would be suicidal
for the scientific community if both were made civilian facilities
and to make entirely new facilities for the military, as this would
be prohibitively expensive and time consuming. Thus one duplication
may have to be carried out, if India was to keep its side of the
bargain, which may be definitely advantageous to us. This would solve
the immediate problem near Mumbai. Most experts believed that the "Iyengar Village" as it is called near Mysore, where an uranium enrichment facility was situated, would have to be made a named military facility. That only left the decision about Kalapkkam where the ATV uranium nuclear reactor is tested and which houses the experimental fast breeder reactor. Experts would also have to decide whether the SBS shipbuilding facility set up at Visakhapatnam for the ATV nuclear submarine construction, could be expanded for the role that Kalpakkam plays for the Navy, or perhaps Kalpakkam may be broken into two if that was possible. Little is published on this. We
offer this analysis for comments as some
US Congressmen went ballistic and were not keen to see legislative
changes to their laws which at present restrict nuclear technology
transfers, till India separates its facilities. This burst came
soon after the Foreign Secretary's speech and some congressmen even
said, "It seems Indians know things about the nuclear deal that
we in Congress don't." USA
now appears to be sounding India out officially on the lines that
this analysis suggests, and probably Mr K Subrahmanyam India's
expert on nuclear matters and the NSA and other experts would assist the
Government in the task ahead. However it was reported, but not
confirmed that the military was not involved in any of the sites and
probably only some concerned Service Chiefs and the SFC had seen
how the cores are stored and readied –– as they wanted some assurance
during OP Parakaram. President Musharraf had then hinted indirectly
that Pakistan was ready to use its nuclear arsenal if its
space/territory was transgressed or its integrity was threatened.
Hence if separation was contemplated the Military may have to get more
involved and in India such action is normally swift and good, when
Indians are forced with few choices before them. It may even
hasten the long awaited appointment of a CDS to really take charge
of the nuclear second strike capability and activate the Strategic
Force Commander under him. A
news item datelined 8 Nov is appended below, as it supports our analysis. A statement made by Arundhati Ghose in 2001 on CTBT is
also appended, to show how times have changed ––
India is now viewed
as a power in the making both militarily and economically to be
given discriminatory treatment. Pakistan is bound to ask for the
same at some point of time. Nuclear
Deal Onus On India: Former US Official New
Delhi – November 08, 2005 The
success of the India–US nuclear deal lies in India fulfilling its
commitment to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities
as the US Congress is "pretty sceptical" about it, an
influential American official said Tuesday. "Once India takes
steps to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities,
President (George W.) Bush will be in a position to go to Congress,
which at the moment is pretty skeptical about the deal," said
former US secretary of Defence William S. Cohen. Cohen,
here as part of a US-India Business Council delegation, was speaking
at a seminar on 'Implementing the US–India strategic partnership'.
According
to Cohen, "To the extent India moves to separate its facilities
and to allow IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspection,
the president can persuade Congress. It will not be easy but there
are people in Congress who will listen to him and support him."
The
landmark India–US civil nuclear energy deal that entails changes
in US laws and guidelines of the influential Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) was signed during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
to the US on July 18. Under
the deal, India is to separate its nuclear and military facilities
and open its civilian facilities for IAEA safeguards. Ms
Arundhati Ghose Quoted in 2001 in a Media Report Former
Indian ambassador to the UN, Ms Arundhati Ghose, had quite
forcefully told the UN-Sponsored Committee on Disarmament that India
would never become party to a discriminatory treaty: "Not now,
not ever." Pakistan's position, hitherto, was that it would not
sign the CTBT as long as India did not do so. There was, therefore,
never any real basis for Pakistan's opposition to the CTBT. The
military in Pakistan, which has always retained exclusive control of
the nuclear weapons programme,
and has always soundly slapped any civilian wrist that has sought to
move to control the nuclear button, has used the privilege to extend
its own sphere of influence and "strategic depth". The
nuclear weapons programme was initiated by former Pakistani prime
minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who exhorted his people to "eat
grass but build the bomb". Bhutto would have found it amazing
had he lived, to see how prophetic his words have turned out to be.
Pakistan is close to becoming a "failed state" as a result
of its militaristic ambitions to compete with India. |
