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New
Delhi, 04 October 2006
Cruise
missiles are a type of guided missile which use a lifting wing and
most often a jet propulsion system to allow sustained flight and
are, in essence, unmanned aircraft. They fall under two principal
categories namely anti-shipping cruise missiles and tactical land
attack cruise missiles (LACM).
Cruise
missiles made their debut during World War II, in the form of the
infamous German V1 “flying bombs”, a crude inaccurate weapon
primarily used in terror attacks against London. The idea had been
around for some time and the Germans had experimented with a device
known as Kettering Bug as early as 1917. A V1 type manned
cruise missile called Okha was also used by the Japanese in
sucide attacks against Allied task forces.
Post-war development efforts by US and USSR were all centered around
captured V1s, resulting in similar designs like the Martin Matador,
RGM-6 Regulus and
KS-1 Kometa (AS-1 Kennel). Ambitious development of
the concept even envisaged intercontinental versions like Northrop
SM-62
Snark, North
American SM-64 Navaho and Russian Myashischev Buran and Lavochkin
Burya but none saw service.
The technology was subsequently rapidly overshadowed by ballistic
missiles which showed more promise of range and reliability needed
at that time to haul thermo-nuclear warheads to intercontinental
ranges. The Russians continued reasecrh recognizing its value as a
short range low cost ship borne weapon useful to attack carrier
battle groups that America was building. Starting from the STYX
(which were used by Indian Navy to batter Karachi harbour in 1971)
Russian anti-ship cruise missiles grew in size, range, velocity and
firepower into leathal monsters like
P-500 Bazalt
(SS-N-12 Sandbox)
and P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck).
It
wasn’t untill 1970s that the idea caught the fancy in USA again,
guided however by a different set of exigencies. As the threat of
all out global nuclear war receded to give way to an age of flexible
response, a need for advanced conventional weapons was felt to fight
and win the tactical battle scenarios. Cruise missiles were found
ideal to carry conventioanl wepon loads to intermediate battlefield
ranges with high accuracy, thanks to advancements in jet propulsion
and sattelite aided navigation technology. The BGM-109 Tomahawk TLAM
was a prime product of such research and caught the fancy of
everyone. It has quickly become an indispensible part of all US
military operations since the 1991 Gulf War and the most visible
element of American punitive actions against state and non state
entities.
Cruise Missiles in Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
The
Indian Ocean is surrounded by a number of states with fairly
advanced cruise missile tecnology. Apart from China which has a
prolific cruise missile industry, there have always been the big
power navies packing a variety of them onboard their surface and
sub-surface combatants and finally the numerous navies of local
nation states which are in turn supplied by those powers. Most of
these missiles are small and inexpensive antishipping types deployed
primarily on board their respective naval assets. In recent years,
US involvement in Afghanistan has contributed to significantly
increase the presence of cruise missile armed ships in the region.
United States Navy remains the premier naval force in
Asia and also leads
in deployment and usage of cruise missiles on its surface and
sub-surface combatants. Large surface combatants such as
Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers equipped
with Mk-41 VLS, have the Tomahawk cruise missiles as standard
armament. In addition
Los Angeles class SSN has also been progressively armed with the same.
These ships and submarines of the USN Seventh Fleet, based at
Pearl Harbour or
Apra Harbour, Guam and forward deployed at Yokosuka, Japan,
routinely deploy in the Indian Ocean. The United States has made
prolific use of these naval assets to launch land attack cruise
missiles both in full fledged wars like the 1991 Gulf conflict and
subsequent punitive strikes at terrorist outfits, like the August
1998 cruise missile strikes on terror bases in Afghanistan (Operation
Infinite Reach). They have also been used extensively in this
role in post 9/11 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during
Operation Enduring Freedom. All such operations have seen a mix of
Tomahawk firing surface ships and submarines. Such a use of
subsurface platforms for targeting land targets with cruise missiles
forms the cornerstone of the new littoral warfare doctrine and was
first witnessed in 1991 Gulf War when two Los Angeles Class
submarines belonging to the Seventh fleet,
USS
Louisville (SSN-724) and USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) were
used in this role. Apart from them, two similarly armed submarines
USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705) and USS Houston
(SSN-713) are permanently based in Guam. US operations in
Afghanistan in 2002 also saw an increased deployement of Tomahawk
carrying ships in the Indain Ocean and Arabian Sea. In particular a
large number of Ticonderoga class cruisers like USS Bunker Hill
(CG-52), USS Chosin (CG-65), USS Cowpens (CG-63), USS
Shiloh (CG-67) and Arleigh Burke destroyers such as USS
Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) have
made active deployments in the area.
Naval forces of South East Asian nation states are also
emerging from the negative after effects of the 2001 Asian economic
crisis and seeing a revival of the expansionist phase of the 1990s.
Several big ticket additions have already been made to these
otherwise modest navies.
Singapore has led the way in deploying the sophisticated French
designed Formidable class frigates followed by Malaysia’s
Lekiu
class frigate from UK. Taiwan also operates a sizeable force
comprising of ex-USN ships namely Kidd class destroyers and
Oliver Hazzard Perry class frigates. The development of these
navies are almost directly related to the expansion of PLAN
(Peoples Liberation
Army Navy)
and
their incresingly active role in the South China sea and numerous
territorial disputes in the region. Therefore as PLAN acquires a
greater degree of sophistication it is bound to find a reflection in
the naval forces of South East Asia. Almost all these new
acquisitions and upgrades carry increasingly sophisticated
anti-shipping cruise missiles as an intrinsic part of their arsenal.
The late model Harpoon and Exocet MM40 Block 3 that they carry, also
include a coastal strike option.
Chinese cruise missile efforts have their origin in massive
reverse engineering construction programmes of 1960s focusing on
churning out unlicensed copies of the Soviet SS-N-2 ‘Styx’.
The resulting family of missiles incorporating varying degrees of
improvements is collectively known by their popular western
designation CSS-N-1/CSS-C-2 Silkworm. These are crudely built and
badly finished weapons that are completely obsolete today. They have
seen combat use at the hands of many Arab users in numerous
skirmishes the most recent being the 1991 Gulf War, and have proved
totally ineffective. Modern PLAN surface combatants carry a new
indigenous anti-ship cruise missiles –– the YJ-83 (NATO: CSS-N-8
Saccade) which is an extended range development of the earlier
YingJi-8/YJ-8, (NATO: CSS-N-4 Sardine) missile. All modern
destroyers beginning from the Type 051B (Luhai class), Type 51C (Shenyang
Class) and Type 052B (Guangzhou class) are armed with YJ-83
variants. Boasting a range of 150 to 200 km, the YJ-8 is almost
identical in length and diameter to the French Exocet anti-ship
missile from which it may have been copied, and is similar to the
U.S. Harpoon and Russian Kh-35. Air launched versions are also
operational on PLAN JH-7 fighters and H-5 bombers (Chinese copy of
Russian Tu-16 Badger), which could potentially operate in the Indian
Ocean from bases in mainland China. Chinese attempts at developing
long-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM) have proved to be more
elusive. Press reports have varyingly sighted US Tomahawks
(reportedly handed over to china by Pakistan from examples which
fell in its territory in 1998 Infinite Reach Strikes) to Russian
Kh-55 (NATO: AS-15 Kent) supposedly supplied by Ukraine, as possible
origins of a Chinese LACM. However, leaving improbables aside it
cannot be ignored that the last two decades have seen a multifaceted
espionage effort on the part of the Chinese to acquire sensitive
military technologies that are desperately needed to modernize its
armed forces. A substantial proportion of that is likely to be
directed towards the indigenous cruise missile effort.
Many shadowy projects have been reported like the ChangFeng
and long range DongHai (DH-10 tested in September 2004), promising
“Tomahawk like capabilities”. However, the most visible outcome of
such research seems to be centered on the YingJi-62 (YJ-62) a new
type of anti-ship missile that first entered service onboard the PLA
Navy’s Type 052C (Lanzhou class) destroyer in 2004. With a claimed
range of 280 km it is thought to be capable of attacking land
targets and uses strap-down inertial guidance coupled with GPS, and
active radar to ensure stand-off precision strike ability. The
missile could still very well be a development of the YJ-83 or based
on Russian Klub with which it shares many design features. It has
similar mid-body fold out wings and lateral air intakes and may be a
proving test bed for follow-on long range systems. Another possible
candidate could be the 500 km range YingJi-63 (YJ-63) an LACM
derived from the HY-4, itself a development of the soviet
Styx. All this could translate into an increasing number of
Chinese surface ships and conventional submarines armed with
increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles available for deployment
in Indian Ocean and capable, for the first time of influencing the littoral
battle.
Some of the latest Chinese cruise missile technology is
expected to find its way to
Pakistan. Indeed
some of the hardware is already in place in the form of older
Silkworm missiles and new acquisitions from
China
like the proposed F-22P frigates are sure to come with the YJ-83 as
their main strike arsenal. The Pakistan Navy also has other fairly
advanced cruise missiles in its arsenal –– RGM-84 Harpoon is used in
large numbers onboard EX US Navy ships and Type 21 frigates from UK
and they are sure to arm the four S class frigates (formerly Kortner
Class) being acquired from Greece. A large order was placed for
Harpoon Block II this year which would introduce a land attack
capability for Pakistan. The ubiquitous Exocet is carried by new
Agosta 90B submarines and provide the Pak Navy with its first
underwater missile launch capability. These missiles are also
routinely carried by its maritime reconnaissance and strike assets
like the P-3C Orion and Atlantique aircraft and thus pose a serious
challenge to Indian Navy all over the Arabian Sea. Majority of the
missiles however are anti-shipping weapons, except of course the
Harpoon Block II or “Sea-slam” versions of the Harpoon, and not
ideal for littoral warfare. That could change fast if the new Hatf
VIII Babur appears in service in any tangible numbers. The test
of this missile took almost everyone by surprise and it was widely
touted in the media as the answer to Indian efforts with Brahmos.
The Babur boasts a longer range of 500kms and advanced INS/GPS (in
some versions TERCOM) guidance. Speculations on the origin of this
missile again veer from
China to reverse
engineered Tomahawks combined with disbelief at Pakistan’s claims.
Very little first hand literature is available on the missile in
public domain and a few photographs reveal a typical subsonic cruise
missile design with a booster launcher. It must be noted that
China
the most likely source has numerous such experimental models in its
prolific cruise missile research programme. Cruise missile
development is a tricky and painstaking business and almost no one
gets it right the first time, so the Pakistan claims must be taken
with a pinch of salt. That doesn’t take away from the fact that
threat quotient has increased for
India,
especially in view of the Babur being declared ‘nuclear capable’.
The new attack can come from any azimuth, defeating the traditional
ballistic missile warning systems.
India of course
cannot remain immune towards the buildup and deployment of such
capabilities in the IOR, but curiously its approach so far has been
largely reactive and devoid of any vigorous purpose. After taking a
famous lead in cruise missile operations during the 1971
Karachi
attacks things remained more or less static for two consecutive
decades. Indian Navy remained the primary user of cruise missiles,
sticking to late model soviet
Styx
variants across its destroyers, frigates and missile boats. And
although Indian security managers did stand up and take notice of
the Tomahawk strikes and its implications, there was little that
could be done without any credible indigenous research programme and
absence of comparable products on the offer list of traditional arms
suppliers. Indeed introduction of second generation systems had to
wait till the end of the decade when Harpoon type Kh-35 missiles
became operational aboard new generation Delhi class destroyers
(Project 15), Brahamputra class frigates (Project 16A) and other
corvettes and missile boats. New generation Russian missiles of the
Klub family also followed on Talwar class frigates (Krivak
III) and upgraded Kilo class submarines. The utility of these
systems however remains strictly limited to an anti shipping role
although IN was already talking of a littoral role for these new
weapons.
Ambiguous press reports have sighted a number of research
programmes the most prominent being the Sagarika, which was
expected to result in an operational LACM option for future nuclear
submarines. Nothing has come of them so far. A study in contrast is
the highly successful Brahmos missile project which has resulted in
an Indo-Russian joint venture to produce the 3K55 Onyx/Yakhont
supersonic cruise missile in
India.
Yakhont was supposed to be a follow on replacement for the SS-N-22
Sunburn missiles which formed the main strike arsenal of Russian
Sovremeny destroyers, before the development funds dried up. It has
seen a remarkable resurrection as the Brahmos which has a max-range
of 290 km thus having a clear littoral strike role from the onset.
The Army is also to deploy it as a tactical battlefield missile and
an air launched version is on its way. Its chief value however would
still primarily lie as an anti ship weapon where supersonic speed
would ensure it a high penetration rate of the target’s defences. It
is already being installed on the older Rajput (Kashin modified
class) destroyers and expectedly to Delhi class ships and all other
upcoming surface combatants. Carriage of at least 16 rounds fired
through a VLS (or a mix of VLS and angled container/launchers)
should ensure a very useful strike capability on such ships. When
the air launched version comes along it would make a lethal addition
to the already impressive potential of the Su-30 MKI giving them a
long range maritime strike role. Future LRMP platforms like the
proposed P-8 are also likely to pack Brahmos in the same role.
In spite of this seemingly remarkable success,
India is still some
time away from a tangible LACM. Attributes of such a system are now
widely understood to have an emphasis on range as opposed to
velocity, a respectable payload and good accuracy. Development of
such a system demands the existence of some key techno-industrial
basic structures. In particular a gas turbine propulsion industry
and advanced guidance and navigation aid. Some of these sub-systems
are available off the shelf, while other key elements have to be
acquired through painstaking research. International consortiums
such as the Brahmos Aerospace also cannot be too useful as
restrictions of MTCR kick in.
India already has a
pool of research experience born out of the learning curve of the
IGMDP and the Brahmos project. Exigencies of advanced GPS guided
navigation can be prospectively met through aids like the GLONASS
which is planned for future amalgamation with Indian military. Much
of the groundwork has already been done and would help to give shape
to a decisive and increasingly indispensable capability for the
Indian military.
Resources
1.
http://www.eads.net
2.
http://www.naval-technology.com
3.
http://www.sinodefence.com
4.
http://www.boeing.com/history/mdc/harpoon.htm
5.
http://www.roe.ru/cataloque/navy_cataloque.html
6.
The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2006
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