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New
Delhi, 30 May 2002
IDC
has had feed back from an Indian Group which follows our Website in
USA. Their views together with Ambassador Dixit's analysis in an
article in HT are posted below.
We
agree that USA can help India out of the impasse in Kashmir by
putting pressure on Pakistan. But the catch is that the Western
World are convinced that if India agrees to the LOC as the
International border, then Pakistan can be made to play ball.
In
any case Mrs Indira Gandhi had done so via the Simla Agreement and
the Gujral doctrine was also on these lines . Even Pandit Nehru had
come to that conclusion, but then since 1990, the Politics of
KASHMIR alienated the people there and the Hindus fled. India did
not abrogate Art 356 and the demography of the State changed. The
Soviet Union collapsed and some minorities decided on Indpendence
and now the Kashmiris are encouraged to sing the same tune and
Musharraff is loving it.
View
From USA
At
St Petersburg in Russia where the US and Russian Presidents held
their summit meeting, President Bush, probably for the first time,
publicly called upon Musharraf to stop Pakistan's cross-border
terrorism against India.
The
President had been quoted by the NEW YORK TIMES of May 26, 2002 as
saying,
"It is very important for President Musharraf to stop –– do
what he said he's going to do in his speech on terror –– and
that is stop the incursions across the Line of Control, which
divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan.”
The
WASHINGTON POST of May 26, 2002 reported that "Gen. Pervez
Musharraf, declared today that infiltration of Islamic militants
into Indian-held Kashmir had stopped"
The
trillion dollar question remains whether the Bush injunction would
be effective and whether Musharraf is telling the truth?
American
journalists, academicians and think tanks specializing on foreign
policy issues, as well as the lawmakers and the administration need
to carefully read the following extremely perceptive analysis of the
mind of Musharraf. If they do, they are likely to say "NO"
to both the above questions. And that will be a tragedy for South
Asia and the World –– UNLESS President Bush makes it ABSOLUTELY
CLEAR to General Musharraf that HE (BUSH) MEANS BUSINESS AND NO
NONSENSE WILL BE TOLERATED. And if Musharraf does NOT behave,
America has other more credible options to quickly complete the task
of destroying the remnants of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban still
hiding in Pakistan. God bless America and the world's democratic
nations!
--Ram
Narayanan
THE
HINDUSTAN TIMES, MAY 26, 2002
UNDERSTANDING
MUSHARRAF'S MIND
By
J N Dixit
In
the simmering tension between India and Pakistan, Indian policy
makers would do well to try to comprehend the mindset of Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf, his policy orientations and actions
arising therefrom.
His
professional and psychological background is not just that of an
army officer but that of a commando and special forces officer. His
psychological make-up and mindset is essentially aggressive,
operation-oriented, uninhibited about taking risks and of an inner
confidence about military victories.
Add
to this his deep ideological commitment to jehad and making Pakistan
the most influential Islamic country in South Asia and West Asia.
He
is permeated by the negative perceptions about India underpinning
the partition and creation of Pakistan. Now as head of state and
chief of the Pakistani Army, he controls the highest levers of power
to determine Islamabad's India policies.
India
should therefore have no illusions about his willingness to have
reasonable compromises on issues at dispute with India. It would be
relevant to mention that on returning from India after the summit
meeting with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra in July
2001, he gave a private assessment to his inner circle that the
Indian political leadership is indecisive and has no unity.
He
went on to give the assessment that the Indian armed forces, though
adequately equipped and well organised, are not backed up by
assertive political will and therefore its morale is not very high.
The state of morale has also been affected by prolonged ambiguities
and covert military operations that Pakistan has engaged in over the
last decade and more.
He
had come to the conclusion that if a war occurs, Pakistan could
certainly match India effectively, if not defeat India. Pakistan's
policies since then clearly reflect these assessments of Musharraf.
Despite
his pledge to oppose all forms of terrorism he continues to maintain
the distinction between terrorism as a general phenomenon and the
terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir. He continues to assert that
the violent movement by the jehadis in Jammu and Kashmir is an
indigenous freedom struggle to counter Indian obstinacies.
Though he banned organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed
and arrested large numbers of their cadres, he has released them
all. The Pakistani government justified this decision by saying
there was no evidence against these cadres. The leaders of these
cadres are in comfortable house arrest. Their communication
facilities and their arms and movements have not been subjected to
any restrictions.
In
fact, Pakistan has encouraged these terrorist organisations to
continue their operations against India under new nomenclatures.
The
high command of the Pakistan armed forces and Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) has continued to infiltrate terrorist cadres into
Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. With the onset
of summer, when the snow melts on the mountains along the border,
this infiltration as well as terrorist violence has increased.
The
May 14 attack on the Indian residential military complex near Jammu
and the killing of Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone clearly indicate
that the planning of and support to terrorist activities from
Pakistan will continue.
The
Pakistani government's immediate objective is to subvert the
preparations for the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly elections due
this year and to ensure that they are not held.
It
is also significant that Lone's murder followed his discussions with
political leaders from the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir in
Sharjah and Dubai. Indian intelligence agencies have clear evidence
that his assassination plan was orchestrated by ISI.
Musharraf
has also to divert Pakistani and Pushtun cadres of Al Qaida who have
escaped from Afghanistan to some enterprises away from Pakistan
proper as otherwise they will create major problems for him in his
relations with the US that are based on his commitment to
neutralising these jehadi cadres. So he has targeted Jammu and
Kashmir.
The
alienation of Jammu and Kashmir from the Indian republic by parallel
violent and political means remains the macro-level political
objective of Musharraf's India policies.
The
inescapable conclusion is that while Musharraf cooperates with the
U.S.
in its campaign against terror, he will continue to nurture and
sustain terrorist violence against India. The objective is to
generate such pressure through these means that it compels India to
come to the negotiating table on his terms.
To
ensure international support to this undeclared objective, he is
utilising two leverages. One, he is citing the Indian military
build-up and diplomatic pressure as an argument and a threat to
Pakistan from which the US and Western democracies should save him.
Two,
he harps on the likelihood of his being compelled to use nuclear
weapons against India which will lead to India retaliating with
nuclear weapons, a situation to which the major powers of the world
would be totally opposed at both the political and military levels.
His strategic anticipations appear being fulfilled as shown in the
high-level diplomatic pressure on India the US, Britain and other
countries are generating.
Vajpayee's
statement last week to soldiers that India would take decisive
action against Pakistan has evoked assertive and smug response from
Musharraf. Apart from affirming Pakistan's capacity and will to
retaliate effectively he has reaffirmed the nuclear threat. It is
clear that the US and the Western powers have a limited objective of
preventing an
India-Pakistan war.
They
do not assign the necessary high priority that India wants to
countering jehadi terrorism against the country. Nor do they seem
inclined to acknowledge a link between Pakistan-sponsored terrorism
and the resulting politico-military pressures, which India is trying
to generate against Pakistan.
This
attitude of the major powers reduces India's options. First, it is
clear that India would have to carry on its campaign against
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir on its own.
Second,
India should structure its Pakistan policies clearly on the
predication that any decisive military option it chooses would
attract opposition from the U.S. and major powers as well as the
U.N.
India
faces a very complex challenge of sustaining its credibility as a
country capable of taking decisive action against Pakistani mischief
despite high international opposition while at the same time
ensuring that domestic processes of elections and reconciliation are
successfully carried out.
While
India mounts diplomatic, political and limited military pressure on
Pakistan, the litmus test would be its success in being able to
effectively neutralise Pakistan's current long-term intentions.
Given developing circumstances, there does not seem to be any
alternative to act decisively in operational terms against
Pakistan's activities in Jammu and Kashmir.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/260502/dlnat11.asp
(The
writer is a former foreign secretary) (IANS)
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