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New
Delhi, 26 October 2002
The
article highlights the blunders of our political leadership in 1962
in matters military. The author opines that 40 years later nothing
seems to have changed
On
14 October 1962 US U-2 spy planes over flying Cuba detected Soviet
military personnel erecting IRBM capable missile launchers. The
CIA’s photo-analysts had also determined that some of the missiles
were lying alongside and that they would be operational within weeks
putting much of mainland USA under less than five minutes of warning
after launch. John F. Kennedy, whose presidency was marred in its
initial weeks by a fiasco when a US organized invasion of Cuba by émigré
Cuban forces floundered on the shoals of the Bay of Pigs, was in no
mood to add another Cuban failure to his record.
On
22 October he ordered a blockade of Cuba and warned the Soviet Union
that all its vessels would be boarded and inspected by US naval
forces. Five days later a Russian flotilla consisting of ships with
more Cuba bound missiles lashed on their decks and with an armed
escort of destroyers and submarines ground to a halt ahead of the
blockading US ships. The two super-powers were now eyeball to
eyeball and unless one blinked there would be Armageddon. Nikita
Khrushchev blinked first and the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its
nuclear missiles from Cuba. Though the USA in turn agreed to
discreetly dismantle its nuclear tipped Jupiter missiles from
Turkey, quite clearly the Soviets had backed down.
Some
recent articles written elsewhere, like I had written earlier in
these columns, on the 40th anniversary of the 1962
Sino-Indian border war, have provoked this narration. These articles
have suggested that the Chinese attack was timed to coincide with
the Cuban Missile Crisis, at a time when the USA was militarily
pre-occupied, as much to take advantage of it as also to put
pressure on the USA. The facts seem to suggest otherwise.
There
might have been something to this logic if the Chinese attack across
the Namka Chu River in Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA), that had begun
on 19 October had continued uninterrupted after the huge gains it
had quickly made. For by 23 October the Chinese PLA’s force of
about three regiments had decimated the Indian Army’s 7 Brigade
commanded by Brig. John Dalvi (taken prisoner) and was within ten
miles of Tawang. On 24 October the PLA entered Tawang unopposed.
That night they were also opposite Walong at the other end of NEFA.
Both, Tawang and Walong were deep inside NEFA. Even in the western
sector despite a determined stand made possible by the deft handling
of resources by Lt.Gen Daulet Singh the Chinese had by and large
occupied all that lay within their claim line here by 21 October.
There was a lull in the fighting in all sectors after this.
On
24 October the Chinese issued a statement that after the predictable
recriminations made three proposals. They were: I. Both sides agree
to respect the line of actual control (LAC) as of November 1959 and
withdraw their forces twenty kilometers from that line. II. If India
agreed to (I), the Chinese agreed to withdraw to the north of the
McMahon line in the eastern sector. (This was significant
considering the PLA was quite deep inside NEFA.) III. That the two
Prime Ministers meet, either in New Delhi or Peking to seek a
friendly settlement. On the very same day a statement was issued by
New Delhi rejecting these proposals. On 4 November, Chou En-lai
wrote to Nehru commending the Chinese proposals and urged Nehru to
accept them. Nehru countered with a proposal on 7 November that the
Chinese should return to the positions they held on 8 September and
that talks follow after this is complied with.
During
this period of renewed diplomatic skirmishing there was a major
development. On 29 October the US Ambassador, John Kenneth
Galbraith, called on his friend Jawaharlal Nehru and offered “any
military equipment India might need.” This started arriving within
five days and soon there were as many as eight USAF and RAF flights
a day each disgorging twenty tons of hardware. Ironically only a few
weeks before this Jawaharlal Nehru while rejecting a suggestion of
India seeking western arms aid equated the acceptance of military
aid with joining a military bloc and declared that India would never
accept this “even if disaster comes to us on the frontier.” The
disaster that visited the 7 Brigade was a small one compared what
was to visit the 4 Division in November.
The
lull that followed the quick Chinese advances to Tawang and Walong
in the east and to the gates of Chushul, instead of causing the
national leaders to introspect and inject some realism in them took
them on new flights of fancy. The defeats gave rise to a wave of
jingoism and euphoria since seen only once after that, during the
Kargil conflict. The Lok Sabha praised the “wonderful and
spontaneous response of the people of India to the emergency.” Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia, always with a way with words, said: “the blood
of our martyred jawans is becoming the seed of a new, virile nation
that is being born in our country.” Little wonder then that Nehru
commented “we never had it so good.”
Instead
of taking stock of what went wrong on the run up to the stinging
defeat at Namka Chu our leaders persuaded themselves that further
battle would beat the Chinese back. When 7 Brigade launched its ill
conceived operation, the decision for which was taken by people at
the highest level overlooking all advice of commanders on the
frontline, the jawans fighting at heights of 12-14000 feet had only
light tunics and one blanket each to fight the cold, and ancient
.303 rifles with about forty rounds each to fight the Chinese. The
massive airlift of western small arms did little to change this
reality. Instead of seeking a respite and allowing the military
leaders the option of choosing the time and place for the next
battle, the politicians, both, in parliament and in the Indian Army
pressed on for another round.
After
the initial debacles in NEFA, Lt. Gen. B M Kaul, who was hastily
appointed commander of the newly created IV Corps, had returned to
the more familiar battlegrounds in New Delhi stricken with pulmonary
edema. Lt. Gen. Harbaksh
Singh replaced him. Harbaksh Singh after studying the changed
tactical position of his troops decided that the next point of
defence would be Bomdila. But he was replaced by Kaul after hardly
four days and transferred out to take command of XXXIII Corps, which
was under Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh. Before the establishment of IV Corps,
created for the express convenience of Kaul, XXXIII Corps was
responsible for the defence of NEFA. Like Lt. Gen. Daulet Singh of
the Western Command, Umrao Singh had consistently warned the higher
ups in New Delhi of the Indian Army’s lack of preparedness to take
on the Chinese PLA. Umrao was now packed off to a staff job.
Kaul
returned with the DMO, Brig. D K Palit, in tow. Palit, who later
wrote a somewhat self-serving yet eminently readable book on the
1962 war, was a favourite of Kaul and a man quite well versed with
the functioning of the Delhi durbar. Palit had earlier commanded the
now ill-fated 7 Brigade and could claim intimate knowledge of the
terrain. Military logic, given the availability of troops and
supplies demanded that they be concentrated in Bomdila, as per the
Indian Army’s three-tiered defence plan for NEFA prepared in 1959
by Lt. Gen. Thorat. This called for at least four brigades. In 1961
Lt. Gen. LP Sen who took over Eastern Command from Thorat determined
that he would need two divisions or six brigades to do the job.
After the debacle at Namka Chu, the 4 Division had only two brigades
to do the job! But Kaul and Palit, fresh out from New Delhi, put out
the word that Se La which was a good sixty miles ahead of Bomdila
and nearer Tawang must be held. The politicians could not afford its
loss. 4 Division’s losses were hastily replenished with troops
rushed to NEFA from the plains and by mid November it was back to
full strength, though not preparedness.
14
November was the Prime Ministers seventy-third birthday and Kaul
wished to give him a present. He launched an attack in the Walong
sector to push the Chinese back over to the other side of the
McMahon line. This was probably the stupidest order he was to ever
give. The PLA had a full division lying in wait at Rima while the
Army’s new 2 Division just had three battalions designated 11
Brigade at Walong. The PLA retaliated with a massive wallop. 11
Brigade fought bravely but was all but wiped out by 17 November even
as newspapers in Delhi were hailing the attack!
The
decision to confront the Chinese at Se La led to the thinning of the
forces at Bomdila, which was now defended by just six companies.
Kaul and Palit did not envisage the possibility of the Chinese
bypassing Se La in any great strength. But this is just what they
did. They took the path known as the Bailey Trail, named after the
British officer who rediscovered the traditional route to Tawang. 4
Division with its main defence centered in Se La was much too thinly
spread and the PLA began hacking at its rear. By the time orders
went out for 62 Brigade to evacuate Se La, it was too late. They
were cut off and its commander Brig. Hoshiar Singh, who was later
awarded the Param Vir Chakra, fell fighting on 17 November. The next
day the divisional headquarters at Dirang Dzong, between Se La and
Bomdila fell. On 20 November Bomdila fell. The rout in NEFA was
complete.
Jawaharlal
Nehru made a broadcast to the nation that night. His broadcast had a
special place for the people of Assam. He said: “Now what has
happened is very serious and very saddening to us and I can well
understand what our friends in Assam must be feeling, because all
this is happening at their doorstep.” Later that night Nehru made
an urgent appeal to the USA for intervene with air strikes against
the Chinese on Indian territory.
I
had written earlier in these columns about how we blundered into a
war with the Chinese. First with the asinine Forward Policy, and
then with absurd orders to hold cartographically and militarily
untenable positions leading to the Namka Chu debacle. Had we used
the interregnum when the Chinese halted their advance and made the
offer to withdraw to positions held prior to November 1959
intelligently, we could have built up our strength with the new
western arms and faced the Chinese another time and place. But our
political system with its emphasis on polemics, and our media ever
willing to conjure up dreams that never can be, for rulers unable to
see their feet of clay even in the light of day caused us to lurch
unthinkingly towards certain disaster. It is still the same story.
Just read the papers.
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