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New
Delhi, 05 September 2006
Two decades of economic growth have fuelled
China’s military
build up that makes even
USA see red and has a concomitant effect on
India too. Experts
in the US, including the intelligence community, are increasingly of
the opinion that the Chinese military has successfully achieved a
far-reaching qualitative advancement in its security and fighting
capabilities since the beginning of the new century. The PLA with
its Airforce and Navy, is quickly becoming an increasingly credible
threat against Taiwan and may even begin to pose a challenge to
US
military preponderance in East Asia in the next decade.
The Chinese "string of pearls" strategy of bases and
diplomatic ties stretching from the
Middle East to the
South China Sea, all point to the fact that China may well be on the
way to contain and challenge
India’s
immediate strategic interests. The bases include a new naval base
under construction at the Pakistani port of Gwadar –– within hearing
distance of the Persian Gulf –– a container port facility at
Chittagong, naval bases in Myanmar and electronic intelligence
gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the
Straits of Malacca, the railway line upto Lhasa and modern roads all
over across the Indo-Tibetan border.
The RAND Corporation in a US Air Force sponsored report, “A
New Direction for
China’s
Defence Industry” as a follow up to an earlier report, had
highlighted that notwithstanding the general perception that
China’s
defence infrastructure was ancient, five factors point to a major
improvement.
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First, a
consistent rise in weapons spending, up by 153 per cent between
1997 and 2003, fueled by a booming economy
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Second, the
exposure of government owned defense companies to
commercialisation,, improving their research, development and
production
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Third, consistent
access to sizeable foreign military equipment and technical
assistance in the last decade, particularly from Russia and Israel
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Fourth, defence
procurement reforms introduced since 1998 and
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Fifth its
successful forays into space
All these factors have helped
China to sharpen
the teeth of it Armed Forces. Much as
China
would like to diversify its purchases, especially from
Europe, it is constrained in this regard by an arms embargo imposed
after the massacre of pro-democracy protestors in
Tiananmen Square in
June 1989. In Mid April this year the European Union decided under
intense political pressure, not to lift the embargo.
Ground Forces
The ground forces
are currently engaged in a series of cutbacks that will result in a
10% reduction of troops from 1.6 million to 1.4 million by the end
of this year. Since the mid-1990s, a large number of the PLA's
estimated 100 manoeuvre divisions have been downsized, deactivated
or transferred into the paramilitary police, leaving around 40
divisions and 43 brigades. With a vast arsenal of outdated
equipment, the Chinese military leaders are seeking to maximise the
effectiveness of their limited funds by selectively procuring modest
amounts of new advanced weapons, while devoting substantial
resources to upgrading existing equipment and investing heavily in
the development of next-generation weapons that are compatible with
its new concept of IT-based warfare.
PLA Air Force
The PLAAF has been
at the top of the funding allocations for much of the past decade,
which had led to a concerted effort to upgrade capabilities through
the acquisition of predominately Russian weapon systems.
China
bought Su-27 and Su-30 fighters; AA-12 air-to-air missiles; SA-10,
SA-15 and SA-20 surface-to-air missiles. Last year alone,
China
spent $1 billion on 24 advanced Russian fighter aircraft. It now has
around 300 advanced Russian and Chinese combat aircraft, which are
armed with sophisticated munitions. The Air force, however, also
faces the pressing challenge of coping with the spreading
obsolescence that affects the rest of its inventory of more than
3,000 combat aircraft.
PLA Navy
The PLA Navy (PLAN)
has rapidly transformed itself from a coastal force into a blue
water naval power with an unprecedented force modernisation drive in
the post-Cold War era. The range and number of warships the Chinese
navy had acquired can be compared to the Soviet Union's race to
become an ocean-going navy to rival the
US
in the 1970s. Chinese weapons for sea-lane control include new
warships equipped with long-range cruise missiles, submarines and
undersea mines. China is also buying aircraft and long-range target
acquisition systems, including optical satellites and maritime
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Surface Fleet
Since 2001, the
Chinese shipbuilding industry produced 23 new amphibious assault
ships and 13 conventional attack submarines, including the launch of
the first of a new class of conventional submarines at
Wuhan in May 2004. Two new guided missile destroyer classes
called 052B and 052C have been launched. The 052C will be fitted
with an advanced integrated air-defense system, supposedly similar
to the US Aegis phased-array radar display, with a high capability
to engage multiple targets simultaneously.
China's surface
fleet (currently consisting of 64 large combatant units –– 21
destroyers and 43 frigates), for the next decade, is engaged in the
process of replacing obsolete ships with more modern units. For this
reason, PLAN continues to bring into service units of Russian
Sovremenny class destroyers, while pursuing the construction of 052B
and 052C class warships, in addition to the construction of a
completely new ship, being built in China's Dalian shipyard, that is
expected to be very large and loaded with heavy surface armament
(probably similar to Russia's Slava class cruisers). At the moment,
the creation of an extensive ship-borne air power by way of aircraft
carriers does not seem to be China’s priority but serious efforts
are afoot to build its first indigenous aircraft carrier.
Submarines
For its underwater fleet of 57 units –– 51 diesel submarines
(SS) and six nuclear powered attack submarines or SSN, PLAN follows
the same pattern as for its surface forces. With significant help
from Russia,
PLAN is modernizing the diesel sub fleet by the decision to acquire
eight other Kilo class boats, following the first four-unit batch
purchased during the 1990s. Beijing, at the same time, is proceeding
with the construction of diesel submarines based on domestic
projects (Type 039 and 039A), which was slowed down by a number of
problems discovered in the planning phase. However, in the next few
years, this process will give rise to the complete replacement of
the large but ineffective diesel submarine force (packed with old
Soviet-design vessels) with a modern and efficient diesel fleet. The
building of the new SSN Type 93 class is proceeding in the same
direction; these vessels, according to PLAN's intentions, should
allow a significant improvement in Chinese submarine warfare
capabilities, especially if the rumors suggesting that the Type 93
class can perform like the Soviet Victor III class or even like the
early US Los Angeles class, are confirmed. It is important to note
that construction of the new Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic
missile class submarines (SSBN) is proceeding very slowly, even if
China can now deploy one unit of this kind (Xia-class).
Conclusions
Over the last few years,
China has been
reasonably transparent in highlighting its major goals in the
modernisation of its armed forces. It is preparing its forces for a
new form of future warfare. Its forces are striving to adapt
themselves to characteristics of modern warfare, focusing on
defensive operations under high technology conditions as the main
objective. China is striving to secure a stable regional environment
for continuing development. It wants to engage in multilateral and
regional institutions based on stronger economic and military
cooperation. However, to avoid miscalculation, senior US officials
have called for more transparency from
China.
The Pentagon’s latest annual assessment of
China’s
military capabilities has highlighted the advanced military
equipment the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is buying or seeking
and its emphasis on western style training, military education and
doctrine, which can strengthen military capability more than just
high tech equipment alone. But the report leaves open the
possibility ––– couched in diplomatic terms as “strategic cross
roads” –– that China could pursue a benign path or a more aggressive
one.
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