Challenges
for India’s Army
By Ranjit B. Rai
(Courtesy:
Asian Military Review)
The
1 million-plus Indian Army, which is the second largest after China,
is acclaimed to be one of the most professional and loyal land
fighting forces in the world. But in view of the ever-changing roles
of the battlefield soldier at the turn of the 21st
century, it is beset with more challenges, than any Army has ever
faced. In this era of global terrorism, revolution in military
affairs with galloping and costly technology, the Indian Army is
groping to reorient itself, with little or no political direction.
The
Indian Army lacks a mission statement unlike the Navy and Air Force,
which have crafted their own. The security affairs of India are
guided through Cabinet Control and to add to the woes of the Army,
India has a large coalition government with leaders of different
hues, most of who have neither military training nor scholarship in
strategic thought or modern management. The strength of some of the
members is based on tradition and Indian scriptures, which may not
be pertinent in the context of security today.
The
Indian Armed Forces remain modeled on the archaic template
bequeathed to India by the British and chiseled by its first Prime
Minister Nehru to ensure the three Service Chiefs who are equal, are
accorded minimal decision making capability for procurement and none
for policy, for fear of “coup d’etats” that plagued West and
South Asia in the late 50’s. There is opportunity for the Army to
now dispel this fear, as democracy is firmly rooted in India.
In
a democracy, no Army, not even the best in the world, can deliver
without the Government laying down military and political aims in
clear terms, and attempting a holistic threat perception for weapon
induction and joint operational planning for war, and to counter
terrorism aggressively. This has not been attempted and no wonder
cynics have dubbed the Indian Army “a meek reactive force”,
which reacts to Pakistan, when in fact, it has fangs, which, when
sharpened, can be awesome in military terms.
Little
initiative is left with the Army. Knee jerk reactions of the
political leaders in all military operations (Op Pawan 1987–91 in
Sri Lanka, Kargil war 1999 and Op Parakarm 2001–2002) and the four
wars (1948, 1962, 1965 and 1971) the Army has fought, saw more
decisions taken to placate the domestic and foreign audiences, to
the detriment of the Army. With no CDS system, inter-service
rivalry, which is a worldwide malady, has always reared its head
higher in India, as each service attempts to get more of the
‘defence pie’. The outgoing Chief of Integrated Staff Lt Gen
Pankaj Joshi had shrilly articulated this in September. These
challenges will persist, but they also pose opportunities for
change, as India’s defence budget is not so constrained, and as
has been observed around the world, the mantra for success lies in
jointness for procurement and operations.
Revolution
In Military Affairs (RMA) And Terrorism
RMA
on one hand, and unabated terrorism from Pakistan on the other, can
be a heady mix for any professional Army as the US Army is learning
only now in Iraq and Afghanistan. The QRs of soldiers inducted into
the manpower intensive Indian Army are traditionally pegged low, and
stress laid on brawn over brain, with the culture permeating even to
the higher levels, where in India’s poorer days, technology was
feared and considered expensive for such a large Army. The soldier
was cannon fodder for victory. Now with the arrival of nuclear
weapons, sophisticated guns (155mm Bofors Howitzers), computers,
WLRS ANTPQ 47s, advanced AA systems with associated radars (Strella,
IGLA and Tangushka), anti tank missiles (Konkurs and Milan2) and
ballistic missiles (Agni I and II and Prithvi), UAVs (Searchers) and
surveillance and night vision equipment (from Israel and France),
the current Army has had to suddenly change its philosophy, culture
and mindset. India’s foot soldier Army needs to convert to
mechanized vehicles with protective armour and reduce manpower, to
curtail revenue costs. The teeth to tail ratio needs change. With a
shortage of 12,000 mid level officers alone, the Army is looking at
net centric warfare, at a time when nearly half the fighting force
is engaged in combating terrorism and border surveillance duties,
leaving little time for reorientation and training of such a large
Army for RMA.
India’s
Armed Forces are under bureaucratic control, which many claim is its
biggest challenge. In times of peace the Army is required to combat
terrorism unleashed by Pakistan, despite a 600,000 strong para-military
force. The Army perforce has to coordinate Intelligence and almost
every military action or operation with the police and para-military
forces of the Central and State governments, which unfortunately for
the Army are controlled by the powerful Home Ministry. The Army has
little authority to chalk out field plans or employ pro-active
tactics in any operation by itself, except restrictively along the
LoC.
At
most times, the secrecy of actions is lost, and human rights
activists raise shrill voices. At the tactical level the initiative
has therefore always been with Pakistan to dictate rates, methods
and places of infiltration. The rules of engagement for the Army are
therefore forever changing, and at most times, political
considerations outweigh military objectives.
In
times of peace, the cross border terrorism unleashed by Pakistan’s
ISI and other Jehadi forces in Kashmir, especially along the
740 km of the LoC, and through the Bangladesh border, has taken the
lives of over one soldier per day at an average. The root cause lies
in the camps established in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir where
Pakistani, Afghani and foreign Jehadis are trained, motivated
and armed before infiltration. The Army has always wanted to hit at
the roots and decimate the camps in POK, but even in the Kargil war
of 1999, the Army was restrained. More recently India leaned on the
USA to restrain Pakistan, to no avail, and now opportunities exist,
to call President Musharraf’s bluff with pro-active operations.
The
Army has excellent paratroop battalions. It has gleaned lessons from
the recent Iraq war and after excelling in exercises with the US
Special Forces, more recently in Ladakh in September, it has
appreciated the importance of Special Forces. This poses great
opportunities to equip and train, top-of-the-line Special Forces to
carry out cross border punitive raids if Pakistan fails to contain
the Jehadis. The Indian Army can achieve results and the
Government must show resolve to support its Army.
Both
in war, and in preparation for war, the Army is dependant on the Air
Force for its air-land-battle concept to attack the enemy from the
air. Though it is acquiring 36 units of SMERCH launchers, the MI
25/35 attack helicopters are flown by the Air Force, and perceptions
differ on this too. The Indian Air Force has the philosophy to first
achieve air superiority before interdiction, while the Army would
like to open the battle with softening air strikes. The commanders
try to resolve the Op plans locally, and the recent OP Parakram,
when the Indian Armed forces were mobilized for war for almost one
year 2001–02, witnessed a lot of coordination sector wise, but not
as a policy.
The
opportunity exists for the Army to take over the attack role
helicopters in a phased manner. That is the way modern Armies are
going. The 500 strong Army pilots are capable and are successfully
carrying out arduous flying in the Siachen region.
DRDO
and
Force Modernisation
Since
the 1970s the Defence and Research Development Organistion (DRDO)
championed the cause of “Made in India” philosophy and assured
the Armed Forces that by the turn of the century Indian Armed Forces
would be 60% self sufficient for its hardware needs. It reinvented
the wheel in large projects to the determent of the Army
This was the story of socialism and non-alignment, and the
greatest sufferer was the Indian Army. The main battle tank Arjun
failed to appear despite 15 years in the making, the T-72 tank could
not get night fighting capability, the basic rifle for the soldier
remained the 7.62 mm and in EW and in night vision devices and
weapon locating radars (the Cymbiline was attempted for upgrade),
the Army found itself deficient and with unprotected vehicles.
Russia bailed India out, by supply of essential hardware, and the
Bofors 155mm Howitzer saved the day in the 1999 Kargil war.
The
Indian Army leadership has only now understood that it needs to plug
the chinks in its own armour both for fighting terrorism and to have
an upper hand in war, as analysts claim India has only a slight edge
over Pakistan in conventional capability. It has therefore, imported
T-90s tanks (with poor night fighting capabilities) and a host of
other equipment and gone to the private sector for vehicles and
other programmes. The DRDO is now collaborating with NPO Mach of
Russia to jointly build the Brahmos missile. The DRDO has expertise
and facilities, hence opportunities now exist to collaborate with
Western defence companies for most unfinished projects. Herein lies
opportunity for the Army’s modernization.
The
IMF-led economic liberalization of India began in 1991 when its
reserves fell to $1 billion. It resulted in neglect of the
modernization needs of the Indian Army. As India’s Defence
allocation hovered around 2.4% of the GDP, deficiencies to the tune
of $ 3 billion resulted in the Army by 1999. Gen VP Malik, who was
the Army Chief during the 1999 Kargil war, stated, “The army’s
modernization programs are in a state of terminal illness. Our
conventional combat edge over Pakistan has been eroding with every
passing year. Unless additional funds are earmarked, future planning
is not possible and the erosion in combat edge will soon become
uncorrectable.” In hindsight it is apparent that when the Indian
armed forces were mobilized on 18th December 2001 in
operation Parakram (Valour), the Army was the first to realize how
woefully short it was of spares, night vision equipment and lethal
punch.
However,
as strategic thought and long-sighted planning in India has been
lacking, it has now come to light that the Army never received any
verbal or written directives on the aims of this massive
mobilization, which lasted till 16th October 2002. Most
training and peace-time activities suffered. The Government cloaked
Op Parakarm as coercive diplomacy, but it tired the Army which lost
728 lives, some 130 first in laying over 1 million mines and then in
clearing them. Malik’s successor Gen S Padmanabhan had this to say
on 9th November 2002. “Whenever there is a situation
calling for (the) Army’s help, the latter’s role should be
clearly defined to avoid confusion”, hinting the Army was not
clear why it was mobilised. It is providential that India did not go
to war. India’s political leadership was jolted out of its slumber
in the stand off with Pakistan, which threatened to use nuclear
weapons if its territorial integrity was transgressed. India
realized that it had to honestly reexamine its nuclear weapon
credibility.
The
Nuclear and Air Defence Challenges
In
May 1998, the strident BJP government took courage and exploded five
nuclear devices including three fusion devices heralding India into
the thermo nuclear club. India and Pakistan have been de facto
accepted as nuclear powers. The scientists of BARC (Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre) and DRDO rode piggy-back on the Army Engineer
regiments deployed at the test site Pokhran, to ensure that their
experiments were a success, but the ‘top brass’ of the Army were
never brought into the loop to devise India’s nuclear strategy or
their deployment. This led to a woolly approach to chart India’s
plans for its nuclear deployment and a draft ‘No First Use’
policy was espoused for the first five years, which no one in
uniform ever questioned. It will be the Armed Forces that would be
hurt by a first strike and yet they were tasked to deploy the second
strike, in a flawed theory. Only early this year an Air Marshal was
appointed as the C in C Strategic Forces and a Nuclear Command
Structure for decision-making announced. The first Nuclear Op
Management course for mid level officers was conducted in November
2003.
The
premise of command and control of nuclear assets remains diffused,
as the Army believes in the principles of Artillery where Command
means training, positioning and readiness of the gunnery forces, and
control means “control of fire”. Attempting to clarify SFC’s
position, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Admiral
Madhvendra Singh articulated three points and confirmed what this
article is conveying. First, the training in nuclear weapons and
servicing of delivery systems would be the responsibility of the
individual services. Second, the utilization and use of nuclear
weapons would be the prerogative of the newly formed SFC. And third,
while the “control” of ballistic missiles will be transferred to
the SFC initially, the Indian Air Force would soon decide on the
transfer of its nuclear capable fighters to the SFC. So far this has
not happened but the Army missile forces have just been nominated
for raising.
Raising
Of Missile Forces
The
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) that stands in for the National
Security Council has cleared the raising of India’s ballistic
missile force. The Pakistan-specific 700 to 800 km range Agni-I and
2,000 km plus Agni-II manufactured by DRDO and Bharat Dynamics are
designated as 334 and 335 Missile groups and based at Secundrabad
where they are manufactured. The scientists would help the Army in
the deployment. Two new Prithvi (150-250km) units for the Army,
which would be named 444 and 555 missiles groups will also be raised
to augment the two Prithvi missile groups – the 222 and the 333,
deployed in Central India, where the Command shelter for the top
leadership is planned. The new missile groups would be operational
by the beginning of 2005. This decision offers the Army its first
opportunity to clarify the command and control structure by a
revisit on all inter-services issues. The IAF-ARMY battle for
nuclear assets and air defence has been simmering for long. India
has received the first shipment of Green Pine AD radar and the plans
for long range AD missiles including the Arrow and the Patriot and
the Russian SU 300 series are in the melting pot. Aerostats are also
due to be positioned soon by the IAF’s Western Command.
India
USA and International Cooperation
A
defence review was attempted to take a holistic view of India’s
military threats and security challenges in 1998 by the National
Security Advisory Board but the events of 9/11 and USA’s lifting
of sanctions and overtures has made the study redundant.
A
new review is being attempted to look at the International World
Order and how India can find a dominant position and voice its
concerns. The Indian Army has close Infantry links with the British
Army. An Indian Army Liaison Officer is stationed in HQ Infantry at
Warminster in UK. More recently, USA is seeking cooperation and
overseeing these interactions is the Defence Policy Group co-chaired
by India’s Defence secretary and the US Under Secretary of Defence
for Policy. Under this is the Joint Technical Group between the two
defence research establishments, the Military Cooperation Group
between the US Joint Staff and the Indian Chief of Integrated
Defence Staff, and the Executive Steering Groups of the Indian Army,
Air Force and Navy, which interact with their counterparts.
The
US Pacific Command is responsible for the region, which includes
India. There is also a Joint Working Group on peacekeeping, a
Security Cooperation Group formed after the 9/11 events to discuss
counter-terrorism-related issues, and a regular exchange between the
defence research and analysis communities in both countries. The
Army is now exercising with US and other forces but it needs to take
greater part in the International arena and opportunities now exist,
with France too. Russian links are already strong. This will enable
it to change its old mindset, and India can be a training hub to
counter terrorism, as it already has facilities for training UN
Peace Keepers.
Conclusion
In
conclusion the challenges before the Indian Army are the unresolved
issues of defining what exactly is expected of this huge
professional military machine and how, in the next decade India will
safe guard its borders and yet quell terrorism, which actually is
the role of the Para military forces and the expanded Rashtriya
Rifles (National Rifles). The policy direction and template for the
Army has to be given by the government, which in the past has never
guided the Army with ground realities in mind. Instead political
realities have always dictated the Government’s edicts to the
India’s Army. This has affected command, control and coordination
and the culture in the Indian Army. However, as it is a loyal
professional force at every level, it has never questioned the
Government or asked it to clarify its role or to define the threat
perception and ambitions of the Government. The Army has been
content to have operational orders in place for its professional
Strike Corps to counter any threat from Pakistan and China. The
arrival of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and most importantly
better Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
capabilities has led to opportunities for the Indian Army to define
the enemy’s vulnerabilities and seek directions whether in the
future the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir territory is to be gained, or
offensive plans implemented, to ensure Pakistan does not dare to
continue its policy of cross border terrorism, and China respects
India. India’s Army deserves a long overdue mission statement, and
the recent cease fire is a good time for the Army to take advantage
of the opportunities that lie ahead.