WHY THE OPERATION TOOK 60 HOURS

27 December 2008

Navy Veteran Speaks

A veteran of counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir, the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, the former Indian Navy officer looks back at the commando operations in Mumbai and provides a candid assessment of the lessons India and Indians need to learn urgently.

On the Armed Forces Filling in For the Lacunae in the Police

What happened on 26/11 was a hardcore police function. The armed forces are not meant for security duties within the country, it's filling in for the lacunae in the police. Some of the better anti-terrorist units abroad are part of the police, not part of the military. Like British and US police have their SWAT teams. The Americans don't call in the Seals, Ninjas and Green Berets when they have something like this in any of the cities. Who are their heroes? The LAPD (Los Angeles Police Department), NYPD (New York Police Department), their SWAT teams.

In our (Marine Commandos) charter of duties, we are prepared for offshore intervention. Within half an hour a MARCOS team can take off for a maritime contingency. We can take on an operation like 26/11 because the core skills are the same. Somebody decided that a military option has to be exercised. They told our guys, go in get them. Our training is not oriented towards capture. When we move in, we kill.

The NSG (National Security Guard) training is very similar to us. In terms of intervention techniques, we (MARCOS) are exactly the same. When the NSG intervened, the training pattern that they have is meant to eliminate the threat. It means killing, doesn't mean capture. Here these guys needed to be captured because of geopolitical ramifications.

On the Fog of War

The MARCOS were launched (early on November 27) when those who sought assistance (the Maharashtra government) did not even know what was happening. There was zero information. This is called the fog of war. It is not specific to this incident, it happens every time there is armed conflict. There is a dense fog of war and you are expected to deliver a very clear result very quickly. It cannot happen, it is not possible.

So in terms of a response mechanism, something should have kicked in which got the necessary information for rational decision making. Somebody should have decided whether it was a gang war, an attack by the Mumbai underworld, what was the nature of the threat, what were they seeking to achieve, how many people were there etc.? By the way, it's not ten people as they are saying, some people have got away.

On How Information Should Have Been Obtained in Real Time

Secondly, there should have been a bunch of senior experienced people who have overseen such ops, from the military, the police, intelligence, NSA (National Security Adviser). We are fabulous at creating committees, we should have had a body like this with nominated members which included a psychologist.

When you're dealing with terrorists, you need an understanding of who the guys are. This kind of a body should have been there, which should have immediately sat down and should have been given connectivity, so that information starts flowing to them, right down to the point where the action is occurring.

This information needs to be got in real time and needs to be passed down to the guy at the ground. I am sure we have very good people who can constitute this team. The first thing is to establish contact. If they (the terrorists) don't want that then you know it's something else, that they've already killed ten people. Then you switch to plan B, C or D. Who was taking the decisions? Who were the mythical guys in the government who were supposed to collate information and decide on the response?

During that time, someone called the Maritime Operation Centre in Mumbai and said we have a situation like this please send us the MARCOS. So the first team of 8 that was standing by for offshore intervention was sent. It has been said that the Navy dilly-dallied. The Navy wanted specific details before (deciding on strategy for) intervention, whether it was a hostage situation, which is very different from just going ahead and eliminating those guys. Rescuing hostages is something different. Nobody knew how many terrorists were there, if they were just wantonly killing off people. At that time, we didn't know.

On How an Attack Like 26/11 Hadn't Taken Place Before?

We have. What happened at Parliament? Luckily, they couldn't come in because of how the Parliament is designed and their training wasn't adequate. This time they have not made the same mistake. The source of the threat is the same -- Pakistan. This time they have penetrated in a better manner, but we have not learnt our lessons. The message behind terrorism is political.

On the Options in the Prevailing Circumstances on 26/11

When you have a threat like this somebody has to decide, what is the threat, what do they perhaps seek to achieve, how are they going about it, who are these guys? This assessment is based on information that you need to collect very quickly. After this you need to decide what needs to be done. This is well before the military is involved. As Ratan Tata very lucidly put it, someone has to find out what is happening. If you read the reports, in the initial confusion the police did not even know what was happening.

The first step should have been to convene a body of experienced people from the administration to take stock. They decide what needs to be done. Let us assume that they found out that the terrorists have no agenda but to kill and it is decided to go in for a military intervention.

itervention, war: ickly. It canThe NSG and MARCOS are informed. They prepare, they come close and don't expose themselves like it was done. Perhaps they could have assembled at the army camp in Colaba (south Mumbai), away from the media glare. By then some information would have trickled in about the number of militants, how they were armed, their position in the hotel etc -- this information should have come from the people who initially ran out of the hotel.

On What Should Have Been Done That Wasn't

The entire area beyond Regal cinema (near the Taj Mahal hotel, Cafe Leopold, Nariman House) should have been cordoned off. The media should have been kept away. All the guests that had managed to leave should have been collected and debriefed before being released. Their names, (phone) numbers, fingerprints should have been taken. The people who should have done this are the NSG's Special Ranger Group, they should have extracted whatever information was possible of what was happening inside and passed to those who were planning it on the ground.

During this planning period, somebody would give them the plan of the hotel, information on how many people were inside, CCTV footage if possible. Then a strategy would be formuated jointly with the senior committee. They could have dropped MARCOS/NSG with choppers (helicopters). It takes exactly 5 seconds to drop a team of 8. A team could have landed on the roof without them knowing what had happened.

Once you know there are 2, 3 terrorists, you could slink NSG/MARCOS from other entries because the terrorists would not be watching all entries at all times. Since it is a massive building, you can insert cameras through hydraulic drills to know the movement of the threat. One footage from the Mumbai police showing that the terrorists were in two rooms during the early hours at the Taj: Then the NSG was not required, it was well within the capability of the MARCOS to take out terrorists sequestered in two rooms. The operation would have lasted exactly two hours.

If this information existed, it hasn't been passed down. These people don't have a response mechanism. Does the government of Maharashtra have a team that is immediately convened in such a crisis?

On Why the Operation Took 60 Hours

What lengthens the intervention period is lack of planning. Lack of planning is because of lack of information. There is no interface between the information gathering apparatus (Intelligence Bureau) and special branches of the police. These two should have been feeding real time information to the planners.

On the Need for Introspection

There are many people who have started introspecting that the casualty levels were very high and it took very long etc. Now they should all sit together -- the NSG, armed forces, police -- and see what lesson have been learnt, what should have happened and what actually happened.

But what is happening is that people are protecting their own turf. That started happening even when the operation was on in those press conferences. There is no feeling of a joint perception of threat. That this is something that concerns India, people are more interested in how this is going to relate to their career.

On Lessons For Special Forces In The Indian Navy

A typical naval officer, rear admiral and above, who takes decisions at various levels in operations like these, what is his career profile like? Nowhere in his career profile has he ever handled Special Forces.

The Navy hasn't fought a war in a long time. There is a certain mindset when you are in active operations and risking your life on a daily basis. There is a difference between people who served in the IPKF -- where peacekeeping was a misnomer, actually we were operating in a very hostile environment. Every day a handful of people died in Sri Lanka.

Guys who came from that background are different from guys who did not see any combat.

The best people don't enter the armed forces anymore. They don't want to come. They are not coming because of an inadequate service environment, not inadequate advertising. It is because of babudom and lack of introspective ability within the armed forces.