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New
Delhi, 31 December 2005
In
retrospect, 2005 may be termed as the year when India's security
policy took on a mature posture befitting its size and economic
potential. It's strategic location astride the world's trade routes
in the Indian Ocean, which carry 60% of the world’s needs,
especially oil energy gives it a distinct edge to influence this
region. Energy security is now part of national defence policy and
PM Manmohan Singh has got USA on our side to ensure that we get
nuclear technology as insurance, while the Navy is being beefed up.
As INFOSYS boss Narain Murthy recommends we need a technocrat for a
Leader and the PM fills the bill and needs to succeed.
While
there were many hiccups to development caused by ageing politicians
and diehard socialists and there was corruption galore, these
perhaps have to be accepted in a democracy, so vibrantly displayed
in India –– the media has done yeoman service and exposed the
highest in the land more than once. A guilt laden Parliament had no
option but to sack 11 MPs.
There
were many terrorist attacks fed by Pakistan and some Jihadi
organisations in the region, but the year was fruitful and very
rewarding for the armed forces despite that. The ceasefire along the
LOC saw fewer deaths in the Army and exposure of the three Armed
Forces to foreign forces in exercises paved the way for higher
operational knowledge and readiness.
Many
large orders like 6 submarines for the Navy were cleared and DRDO
silently made some progress after a long time in its missile and
other programmes and the BRAHMOS missile is set to come of age in
the RAJPUT class while the IAF can fuel its arsenal in the air for
longer ranges from the IL 78s and deliver nukes, which proves
India's deterrence is beginning to come into play.
India's
economy galloped as it never has, and the Armed Forces especially
the army saw money in their coffers and calm in Kashmir and its guns
silent along the line of control after years, so they have had the
time and resources to build a large back log of accommdation for the
troops, bringing about some level of happiness. It will take years
before the Army can tidy its whole house but it has begun to look to
it .
The
Army did face the wrath of the inhabitants of the North East where
the Nagas, Bodos and Manipuris have agendas of insurgency and have
been clamouring for independence –– but years of misuse of the
Special Powers Act which provides it immunity coupled with the
complicity of politicians have now come out in the media, and
measures are being taken to correct that. The loss of uniformed
soldiers due to insurgency this year was yet the least in years and
below the average of 500 annually.
The
Navy finally embarked on a major expansion drive with the government
giving it all support. The IAF looks to receiving the Phalcon AWACS
and ordering 126 Fighters and upgrading its fleet of planes as VIPs
and senior brass now travel in the new Embraer planes like President
Bush does. It shows in some ways India has come of age.
The
negatives have been no CDS to guide the Armed Forces, poor
governanace., poor law and order, and health and no concrete
measures for education and that can be blamed squarely on the
Bureaucrats –– however, signs of shake up are to be seen on the
horizon and that augurs well for India of tomorrow. Happy New Year
from IDC and thank you for watching us grow in your service as a
hobby we enjoy with your participation.
We
can do no better than post our friend Manoj Joshi's piece which
echoes India's newly found respected place in the world .He calls it
‘The Rising’ and we agree as he has risen too from TOI to HT in
more ways than one.
The
Rising
By
Manoj Joshi
www.hindustantimes.com
December
28, 2005
Condoleezza
Rice, Wen Jiabao, Junichiro Koizumi’s visits, the signing of a
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement with Singapore,
participation in the East Asia Summit and its active role in the WTO
negotiations — all in 2005 — are perhaps the best indicator of
the pivotal role that India has begun to play in the emerging Asian
balance of power. The year gone by, and the one to come have
enormous significance for India because today it occupies a unique
geopolitical position in Asia.
Located
where it is, on the flanks of the Asean and the East Asian region,
and those of the West and Central Asia, India is in a swing-zone
from where its huge working age population, intellectual resources,
manufacturing and agricultural potential and military power, can
enable it to influence events in these regions.
There
is a 19th century echo in the word ‘geopolitics’. Yet, it best
describes the moves taking place on the chessboard of nations today.
In the most basic sense, ‘geopolitics’ is about the correlation
between geographical location and political power, and the division
of the world into core and periphery areas. But in a more
sophisticated sense, it is a palimpsest layered over by the
resources a nation has, both physical and human, its demographic
profile, its political system and its military power. Given its
size, India is both a heartland and a maritime nation. In its north,
there are vast land-locked states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan, each the size of a large European nation. On
the other hand, India’s political geography — primarily its
unresolved conflict with Pakistan and its troubled North-east —
makes it a maritime nation because most of its trade is seaborne and
dependent on the security of sea lanes. The peninsula, adjacent the
key oil sea lane flowing from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of
Malacca, only serves to accentuate this.
India’s
potential was always there, but it was locked up in a State that was
a founder-member of the non-aligned movement, and whose economic
policies verged on the autarkic, and some will argue,
self-defeating. In 1990-91, the end of the Cold War and a domestic
economic crisis compelled change. India practically abandoned the
non-aligned movement, dismantled the licence-quota raj and opened
itself to the East and West. Instead of traps and pitfalls, India
found opportunities: its English-oriented education system yielded
Business Process Outsourcing advantages; liberalisation unleashed
economic growth, expanding domestic and export markets; and the 1998
nuclear weapons test signalled that it was not willing to be
militarily consigned to a tier of second-ranking global States.
Since
then the country followed a three-pronged approach. First, to
reintegrate India into the world economy. Second, to ensure the
integrity and security of the country. And, third, to further its
political and economic interests in the Asian region and across the
globe. In these endeavours, it is seeking to move the big
geopolitical blocks — retain good ties with Russia, improve ties
with China, build strategic coalitions with the US, the EU and Japan
— with the expectation that the smaller ones will fall into place
on their own.
In
the process, India has emerged as a significant element in the
emerging geopolitical equations that are sought to be rewritten in
Asia as a consequence of the rise of China. India’s importance
comes from the fact that it is No. 2, behind China, on virtually
every measure of power. Had we been No. 1, everyone would be finding
ways to check us. As No. 2 we are in a safe position of not being
viewed as hegemonic (except in our limited South Asian region), and
courted by big players like the US, Japan and the EU. Perhaps the
most intriguing aspect of our current trajectory is the
not-so-subtle declaration by the US that it is committed to helping
India become a world power in the 21st century. The US decision to
overturn its decades-old policy of denying India nuclear and space
technologies is one outcome of this, as are the Japanese moves to
sharply step up their engagement with India.
In
orthodox balance-of-power theory, States choose to balance or
bandwagon a hegemonic power. The choice before many of the smaller
Asian powers is to bandwagon with rising China, or help balance it.
As of now, with a bit of push from the US and Japan, they appear to
be following the latter strategy — in classical terms, seeking a
state of stability or parity between opposing forces. This was the
principle that drove the post-Westphalian State system in Europe,
which was based on the understanding that the only way to check
power was by ensuring a balance or parity through diplomatic or
military action.
But
we must be careful not to transpose too much of the 19th century
balance-of-power ideas on the situation of today. In a world where
rivals like the US and China are each other’s biggest trade
partners, and nuclear weapons maintain the balance of terror,
competing States need to evolve ways of cooperating with each other
and developing a vested interest in the other’s well-being. That
is why it would be a serious mistake to see India as an element of
some new strategic alliance system aimed at China. True, China’s
continuing efforts to hobble India by providing nuclear and missile
technology to Pakistan are not those of a friendly country. But big
boys don’t cry. They get on with the game. And that is what India
is doing in seeking to resolve its border dispute and to forge
deeper economic links with China.
There
was a time when geopolitical power was defined by simple arithmetic
of adding the tanks, aircraft and warships, or counting the GDP
numbers and natural resources. No longer. Nuclear weapons can, if
used, trump any conventional measure of military strength. But the
lesson of the Soviet collapse was that even nuclear weapons cannot
get you too far. Russia’s present predicament, among other things,
is its adverse demographic profile that limits the advantages of its
enormous geographical spread and natural resources. As the example
of Japan shows, economic might alone is not enough. Neither, for
that matter, as the case of Saudi Arabia would reveal, control over
strategic resources like oil.
Power
today is a multifarious compound of economic strength, cultural
vibrancy, diplomatic skills and, of course, military power. It is as
much about location, as it is about an optimum mix of soft and hard
power. In all these departments, India has something going for it,
and hence the attention it is getting. But India’s role in this is
not so much aimed at China, as towards peace and stability of the
Asian region.
It
is a well-known axiom that the strength of a gravitational force is
proportional to the mass of a body. In the Asian context, there is
just one country that can approach China in terms of its size,
population, economic potential and military capacity, and that is
India. The new geopolitics is not about revising the Cold War to
contain rising China, but about the emergence of a body with
sufficient gravitational force of its own. One that will offset the
enormous pull, and consequent strains, that are being exerted on the
world system by its rise.
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